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This study examines the Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS)
Program which was established as a result of Defense
Department spare parts pricing problems experienced in 1983-
1984. The study focuses on how BOSS initiatives might be
institutionalized in the Navy Field Contracting System
(NFCS) .
The study reviews the BOSS organization, initiatives,
and the current status of the program. The study examines
methods which would facilitate effective incorporation of
the BOSS initiatives within the NFCS and analyzes problems
and issues related to these methods.
The researcher found two alternative methods of
integrating the BOSS initiatives. The first is use of the
Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS) to incorporate
continued BOSS Program funding. The second is to fold the
maturing BOSS Program into the Competition Advocate General
Priority Objectives. Recommendations concerning these two
alternatives as well as modifications to current regulations
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The ability of the nation to deter aggression and defend
its vital interests has long depended upon a healthy private
defense industry that functions as part of a free enterprise
economy. The special relationship of the military working
with private industry, in a competitive environment, has
served this country well in preserving democracy for over
200 years.
To maintain our way of life however, does require the
military to function well beyond our shores. The capacity
to fight or deter aggression hinges on the ability to
project fighting forces where and when they are needed and
to sustain them for as long as they are needed. If one
looks at any defense periodical, the recurring issues today
are Readiness and Sustainability. These two issues, in the
midst of crisis in the Middle East, Afghanistan and South
America, are the backbone of today's national defense
posture. Subsequently, the availability of spare parts is a
key determinant to this nation's readiness and ability to
sustain the military in a conflict.
Spare parts for the Department of Defense in Fiscal Year
86 totalled more than four million inventory items which
comprised approximately $22.4 billion in the Department of
Defense budget. [Ref. l:p. 1]
A spare part can be anything from an inexpensive non-
critical bolt to a highly critical fuel regulator costing
thousands of dollars. However, closely controlled and
audited, these big-ticket purchases generally are not part
of the recent pricing problem. More often the media reports
of overpricing have focused on low-value, low-visibility
spare parts such as $435 hammers, $110 diodes, and $1100
stool caps. To further complicate the issue is the
unfortunate connotation by the public of the word "spares."
Whether applied to low-cost or high-cost items, it suggests
something unneeded or extra and distorts the true
ramifications of the pricing issue. Given the impact of
technology on modern logistics, replenishment parts for
military equipment are not "spare" in the traditional sense
of the word. Rather, a spare is purchased not because it
may be needed, but because it will be needed.
Unfortunately, the Department of Defense was subjected to
the following headlines:
"FEDERAL SUPPLY PARTS COULD SAVE NAVY SPARE CHANGE"
"PENTAGON SAID TO WASTE BILLIONS ON SPARE PARTS"
"NAVY BUYING SYSTEM ASSAILED"
"PENTAGON WARNED ON PARTS BILLS"
As a result of these headlines and reports of "pricing
horror stories," the Department of Defense (DOD) was
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subjected to an intense investigation of how it conducts
business. It soon became clear that the public was
concerned, since the American taxpayer has the right and
duty to demand a full return on their tax dollars,
especially those used for national defense. Not
unexpectedly, revelations about $435 hammers and $30 machine
screws caused many taxpayers to question the management
capabilities of not only the government but also the
integrity of defense contractors. An Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) report on this same subject
confirmed that the procurement process for spare parts had
problems. It added that while:
horror stories have created a public perception of a
problem far more common and pervasive than is actually
the case, they do serve as a warning that additional
management attention is needed. [Ref. l:p. 2]
The indictment of spare parts pricing is serious not
only because it suggests waste, but also because it erodes
credibility of vital defense programs and effectively
undermines our ability to buy the military protection the
country requires.
As Congressional and news media continued to build,
regarding the spares issues, the Department of Defense began
serious efforts to identify and correct the problems that
lead to overpricing. In fact, DOD studies as early as 1963
documented the existence of problems with spare parts
pricing, exhibiting the same symptoms then as now. [Ref.
2: pp. ii,iii] Department of Defense programs were
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introduced as early as November 1964 covering breakout of
certain spare parts from major systems contracts in order to
buy parts directly from manufacturers to obtain lower
prices. [Ref. 3:p. 84]
This initiative was revised and expanded in June 1983 as
one of the early significant elements of a new major spare
parts reform effort by DOD. As a result, on 25 July 1983,
Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, issued a 10-point
outline which was followed by a twenty-five point plan of
how the Military Departments should proceed to correct the
problems that existed in the acquisition of spares.
[Ref. 4,5]
Today, over three years after the Secretary of Defense
issued his plans, many of the same basic problems cited in
1963 and again identified in 1983 continue to exist. [Ref.
6:pp. 62-70] This was reinforced as recently as June 1986
when the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management (Packard Commission) reinforced the fact by
stated:
. . . for example, government insistence on rigid custom
specifications for products, despite the commercial
availability of adequate alternative items costing
much less; the ordering of spare parts so late in a
program, after the close of the production line, that
they must be expensively hand tooled; the use of
unsuitable cost allocation procedures that grossly
distort prices of inexpensive spare parts; the buying
of spare parts in uneconomic small quantities and
hence at higher prices; and the simple exercise of
poor judgement by acquisition personnel. [Ref. 6:p. 44]
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This is not to say, however, that significant progress
has not occurred. In fact, in response to the Secretary of
Defense directive, each service and the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA) , embarked on ambitious reform programs with
considerable resolve. These programs involved retrenching
in the areas of commitment to procurement personnel
resources, training, competition, data management, and spare
parts breakout. Competitive procurement methods are being
sold to Congress as the key to controlling costs in
procurement. [Ref. 7]
Prompted by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy
designed in 1983 the Buy Our Spares Smart Program or "BOSS."
BOSS was assigned to the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP) under the PML-550 program direction. Under this
program's umbrella, over 126 initiatives, in response to
those identified by the Secretary of Defense, have been
undertaken and have significantly changed the way the Navy
acquires spare parts. As a result of BOSS, the Navy has
saved a total of $902 million in fiscal years 1984-1986 with
an investment of $188 million. [Refs. 8,9,10] BOSS as a
program, has helped minimize the future occurrence of
"horror stories" and has helped restore public and
Congressional confidence in the Navy's ability to overcome
acquisition problems and use resources effectively.
However, PML-550 is a project office which is programmed for
funding only through 1991. As a result, the major thrust of
11
Project BOSS is to identify and institutionalize the changes
necessary to enable the Navy to buy high quality spare parts
at fair and reasonable prices. To ensure long term
institutionalization of the changes brought about by the
BOSS Program, financial and management commitments must be
maintained in future years. It is in this area the
researcher has devoted study effort.
B. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
The area of research will focus on institutionalizing
the Buy Our Spares Smart Program. The accomplishment of
BOSS reflect how increased management attention in concert
with the investment of resources can indeed reduce the cost
of spare parts. To ensure long term effectiveness of the
changes initiated, the financial and management commitments
must be maintained if change is to become a part of the
fabric of the of the Navy's Acquisition and Logistics
process. Currently, the status of BOSS reflects that 88 of
126 initiatives have been completed. The researcher will
focus on the completed, continuing, and open initiatives
while looking at the methods of institutionalization for
each.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The basic purpose of this study is to discuss the
methods of institutionalizing BOSS Program initiatives into
the Navy's Acquisition and Logistics process. The
12
researcher sought to determine what the current methods of
BOSS institutionalization were and their effectiveness. The
researcher also sought to identify additional methods that
would facilitate effective integration of the BOSS Program
initiatives. The identification of these integration
methods would enhance the reduction in costs for spare
parts procurement and provide viable avenues for
institutionalizing future BOSS Program initiatives.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was:
What actions are required to effectively incorporate the
Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) Program Initiatives into the
Acquisition and Logistics process?
Subsidiary research questions were:
1. What are the BOSS Program's principal areas of concern
and what are its components, goals and objectives?
2. How are BOSS goals and objectives implemented into the
Navy's regulatory directive and instruction system?
3
.
How have the BOSS initiatives been implemented at the
field activities?
4 How can the competition advocate at the field level
facilitate the institutionalization process?
5. How might the Automated Procurement and Accounting
Data Entry System (APADE) facilitate the
implementation of BOSS Program Initiatives?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information used in this thesis was obtained from
several sources. First, a review of the existing literature
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was conducted to obtain an understanding of spare parts
pricing issues and the Navy's Buy Our Spares Smart Program.
The literature review was conducted primarily through the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) and
the BOSS Annual Reports. Additional information was
obtained from other research studies and thesis, as well as
current Federal directives and instructions listed in the
bibliography.
Secondly, research data were obtained through direct
questioning and discussions at Navy Field Contracting System
Activities, PML-550, and through telephone interviews. The
interviews were conducted to obtain responses on the process
of institutionalization of the BOSS Program initiatives.
Interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis in
order to obtain honest and candid opinions.
Third, observation at field level activities was
conducted to focus on patterns of BOSS Program
implementation and identify barriers to full
institutionalization of the BOSS Program Initiatives.
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is to identify and analyze the
factors used in institutionalizing the BOSS Program
initiatives. It is not the intent of the researcher to
develop a universal system for program institutionalization,
but rather, to study the current process within the BOSS
Program and the criteria used in determining that a BOSS
14
initiative has been completed. The research is intended to
develop a list of key factors, evaluate their
interrelationships and provide recommendations for their
application in the decision making process.
This study is limited to the identification of methods
of institutionalization and variables to consider in working
with a major program. This study does not attempt to
develop a standard checklist to be used as a guide or
directive in institutionalization.
The research is designed to identify those unique
problems inherent in the institutionalization of a program
and identify barriers and effective integration methods that
hinder or facilitate the process.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with standard
Department of Defense acquisition concepts and terminology
as well as the spare parts procurement process.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II
provides an introduction to the Navy's spare parts
acquisition process within the larger context of the major
systems acquisition process. An overview of the Navy's Buy
Our Spares Smart (BOSS) Program is provided as well as how
the program affects activities within the Navy Field
Contracting System (NFCS) . Chapter III is a presentation of
the issues related to institutionalizing change within the
Navy and some of the specific problems encountered within
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the BOSS Program. This chapter discusses the data gathered
during interviews and literature research on the
institutionalization process within the BOSS Program.
Chapter IV is an analysis of the issues and identifies
alternative methods of institutionalization identified
during the research process.
Chapter V is a discussion of the implications and
consequences of utilizing the different methods of
institutionalization. Finally, Chapter VI provides the
conclusions and recommendations for utilizing these methods
in making sensible decisions for institutionalization of the
BOSS Program Initiatives within the Navy Field Contracting
System activities.
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II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the 1970 's were a decade of
military spending restrained by the efforts of detente. Our
outlays for national defense declined by 2 0% while the
Soviet Union continued one of the greatest peacetime
military expansions in history. The result was by 1980, the
United States had an ill-equipped Army, too many aircraft
grounded for lack of parts, and ships that could not leave
the pier. [Ref. 11 :p. 3] By the end of the decade
however, the Carter administration and the American people,
realized that unilateral restraint was unenforceable and
subsequently not working. There became an increasing push
for higher defense spending and revitalization of the
military forces. In 1981, the Reagan administration took
office promising to restore defense spending and rebuild
world confidence in U.S. military capability. [Ref. ll:p.
4]
However, in 1983, "horror stories" of $110 diodes and
$435 hammers had a dramatic effect on the way the public and
Congress perceived our use of public funds. The resulting
Congressional and public interest resulted in the Department
of Defense taking a hard look at the spare parts buying and
selling process. At first, as in the case of the $110
17
diode, it appeared that the excessive price was due to the
pricing concept used and not the actual cost of the item.
In this situation, formula pricing was used in an attempt to
avoid the inefficient and labor intensive process of cost
element detailing. Cost element detailing required
identifying the procurement of the material and following
the part as it goes through manufacturing, inspection,
packaging and shipping. For example, Table 1 reflects the
purchase of two line items from the contractor. In example
A, material handling labor costs were based upon a pre-
negotiated quantity and rate to be applied in an equal
amount to each line item being purchased which in. this case
is a diode and a power supply. Although the pre-negotiated
quantity and rate may have reflected accurate historical
average material handling costs incurred per line item, the
use of average costs distorts the price of the relatively
inexpensive diodes for which practically no material
handling effort was expended and correspondingly, this
method understates the price of handling the power supply.
A reallocation of the same quantity of material handling
labor hours on the basis of total purchased parts cost as in
example B of Table 1, results in more reasonable unit
prices. Thus the $110 diode has been described as "apparent
overpricing" as opposed to "real overpricing" as the
contractor was entitled, under the Cost Accounting Standards
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Purchased Parts (2/$. 04)
Direct Labor Hours
9.0 @ $18.00 = $162.00
Overhead
94% of Value Added
Total Cost Input $157.22 $ 757.14
G&A @ 21% 33.02 159.00
Total Cost $190.24 $ 916.14
Profit @ 16% 30.44 146.58
Total Price $220.68 $1062.72
Unit Price $110.35 $ 177.12
Contract Price $1283 . 40
Example B
Material Handling Labor Cost
Prorated on Basis of Total Purchased Parts Cost
Diode Power Supply
Purchased Parts (2/$.,04t) $ .08 (6/$100) $ 600.00
Direct Labor Hours
9.0 @ $18.00 = $162.00 .02 161.98
Overhead
94% of Value Added .02 152.26
Total Cost Input $ .12 $ 914.24
G&A @ 21% .03 191.99
Total Cost $ .15 $1106.23
Profit @ 16% .03 176.99
Total Price $ .18 $1283.22
Unit Price $ .09 $ 213.87
Contract Price $1283. 40
SOURCE : Lavender , W . R
.
1 / The Spa:re Parts Cost Center Concept
as a Means of Improving Spare Part Pricing; A Case Study .
M.S. Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, December 1985,
Table I.
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recover the costs included in the distorted unit price [Ref.
12:p. 27]. However, the perception by Congress and the
public was that contractors were overcharging the
Government. This made application of the equal allocation
method in conjunction with formula pricing unacceptable in
the public eye.
Does this example then indicate the 1983 "horror
stories" were merely administrative or simply allocation
problems could be easily solved? The answer was,
unfortunately, no. Further investigation revealed the
"horror stories" were more than isolated instances. In FY
1983 , a DOD-wide audit of spare parts procurement resulted
in reviewed 621 Navy parts with the following conclusions
regarding 621 Navy parts:
- 58% of the parts (3 63 items) were obtained at
reasonable prices.
- 35% of the parts (215 items) were acquired at prices the
auditors determined to be unreasonably priced.
- 7% of the parts (43 items) were obtained at prices
whereby inadequate data prevented the auditors from
making a conclusion as to reasonableness. [Ref. 13]
The audit told a story of an overclericalized and
undermanned system of buying and an often short-sighted
system of selling. Investigations found recurring examples
of over reliance on prime contractors, unreasonable cost
allocation methods, antiquated ADP systems, unsupported
claims of proprietary rights, and contractor mark-ups on
"pass through" items with no value added. [Ref. 13] The
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irony of the "horror stories" is that they were discovered
by DOD auditors and inspectors. A special unit was then
formed to prosecute defense related fraud cases. [Ref.
14 :p. 2]
The Department of Defense acknowledged the problem and
acted promptly and decisively to correct the situation. On
25 July 1983, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger issued
the following policy statement:
Our recent audits and investigations of aircraft spare
parts accounts demonstrate conclusively that we must make
major changes in the way we order and purchase spare
parts. The directive we instituted in March 1981 to
increase competitive bidding and hold down prices has not
been enforced vigorously enough throughout the Defense
Department. To ensure that we are not plagued with
pricing abuses in the* future, we have developed and put
into place a ten-point program. It is our joint
responsibility to see that all civilian and military
personnel in the procurement branches of the department
comply with these procedures.
First, we should offer incentives to increase competitive
bidding and reward employees who rigorously pursue cost
savings. Actions such as the Air Force's percent award of
a 1100 dollar bonus to the Air Force sergeant who
uncovered excessive overpricing on a spare part should be
continued and given your personal attention.
Second, I expect you to take stern disciplinary action
including reprimand, demotion and dismissal of those
employees who are negligent in implementing our
procedures
.
Third, I have directed Deputy Secretary Thayer to work
with the service secretaries to alert defense contractors
to the seriousness of the problem and of our firm
intention to keep prices under control. We expect them to
ensure that their employees also pursue fair pricing
practices by undertaking disciplinary action when
necessary or rewarding employees where appropriate. I
will carry this message to defense contractors in
Hartford, Connecticut in a speech I will give there later
this week.
Fourth, now that all of the services have competition
advocates in place in their buying commands, I expect
those competition advocates to challenge orders that are
not made competitively or appear to be excessively priced
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and I expect our procurement officers to heed their
advice.
Fifth, we simply must refuse to pay unjustified price
increases. I know the Air Force now carefully checks
price increases on aircraft spare parts. If the price
increase is excessive, the Air Force is refusing to pay
it. Such efforts are already underway in the other
services and they should continue to receive the highest
priority. To assist you in these efforts, the Defense
Contract Audit Agency will work with your contract
administration offices to strengthen spare parts
purchases
.
Sixth, we must accelerate reform of our basic contract
procedures. The inspector general's recent investigations
underscore the importance of reforming our basic contract
procedures to encourage competition, preclude overpricing
and, as an added insurance, give us the legal right to
recover excessive payments. For example, many of our
existing basic ordering agreements routinely carried a
price redeterminable clause which allowed the manufacturer
to set the price for repeat orders of spare parts. You
should continue to phase out existing portions of ordering
requirements which allow the manufacturer to redetermine
prices and make every effort to obtain firm fixed-price
contracts. We must redouble ongoing attempts to increase
the number of contracts open for competitive bidding.
Seventh, we must take steps to obtain refunds in instances
where we have been overcharged. In those contracts where
we have the right to reduce an excessive price and set a
more equitable price, we should not hesitate to exercise
that right. If we have to, we should sue a contractor to
recover unjustified payments. In some cases the contracts
we signed may not give us the legal right to a refund. In
these instances, the services and the department should
aggressively pursue refunds through discussions with
senior managers of the company similar to those Secretary
Lehman is currently conducting with the Sperry Corporation
and Gould Simulation Systems Inc. We should convey to
them our strong belief that it is in the best interests of
both the Department of Defense and the defense industry to
have contractors voluntarily refund any payments that are
clearly exorbitant and unjustified.
Eighth, where alternative sources of supply are available,
we should cease doing business with those contractors who
are guilty of unjustified and excessive pricing and who
refuse to refund any improper overcharges. If alternate
sources, domestic or foreign, are not available, we will
do our best to develop such sources rapidly. In December
1982, we significantly strengthened our procedures for
suspending and disbarring irresponsible contractors. We
should exercise those administrative powers in a timely
22
manner or within 30 days of indictment or conviction of a
contractor.
Ninth, our audits and investigations of spare parts will
continue. In addition to the eight audits the Inspector
General has already conducted, service auditors have
conducted some 25 others. The Inspector General has six
additional audits in progress, and will begin three others
in the next few months. These will focus on the broader
ramifications of how we buy spare parts, what we pay for
them, and how they are used and controlled once they enter
the inventory. In addition to investigating aircraft
engine spare parts, we will now look at cost growth in
electronic spares and contract administration activities.
The tenth and final point, is that the Defense Department
purchases millions of spare parts worth billions of
dollars each year. I think you will agree that in the
majority of cases we have been satisfied with the quality
and prices of those spare parts. The many fine
corporations and dedicated employees supporting our
nation's defense should not be maligned as a group for the
failures of a few. However, it is our responsibility to
ensure that we do not waste one dollar of the taxpayers'
s
money. We must recover unjustified payments we have
already made, and where necessary, to expose and take
appropriate corrective action against those contractors
and employees who are either negligent in performing their
duties or are engaging in excessive pricing practices.
[Ref. 4]
Following closely on the heels of Secretary
Weinburger's ten point plan were 25 additional initiatives,
as identified in Appendix A. These were promulgated on 29
August 1983 and required implementation by the services.
[Ref. 5]
With the Federal deficit running into the hundreds of
billions of dollars and with bipartisan cries for defense
budget, cuts coming from every angle, it was obvious the
Department of Defense could no longer afford business as
usual. A new dimension had now been added to the business
relationship between the Navy and its spare parts suppliers.
Underlying the traditional framework of contracting, there
23
exists a new emphasis on business sense and public
consciousness. In the Navy, the program is called project
BOSS (Buy Our Spares Smart) and its objective is to
"identify and institutionalize the changes necessary to
permit the purchase of high quality spare parts at fair and
reasonable prices" [Ref 8: p.l].
B. NAVY FIELD CONTRACTING SYSTEM
A large and complex organization, the Navy Field
Contracting System consists of over 900 activities which
report to the Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) . The
largest activities which make up the major portion of the
Navy Field Contracting System are the Navy Regional
Contracting Centers, Naval Research Laboratories, Naval
Supply Centers, Naval Supply Depots, the Ships Parts Control
Center, and the Aviation Supply Office. In accordance with
NAVSUP Publication 560,
The Navy Field Contracting System consists of all
contracting offices of naval activities, including fleet
units, except for the following contracting and contract
administration offices:
1. Automatic Data Processing Selection Office;
2. Office of the Naval Research, its Branch Offices and
its Resident Representatives;
3. Military Sealift Command and its field activities;
4. Marine Corps and its field activities; except for
Marine Corps Air Stations which are part of NFCS
;
5. Headquarters, Naval Air Systems Command, its Naval
Plant Representative Offices and its Naval Aviation
Logistics Center;
6. Headquarters, Naval Sea Systems Command, its Naval
Plant Representative Offices and its Supervisors of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair;
7. Headquarters, Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command; and,
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8. Headquarters, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
and its field activities. [Ref. 15:p. 1.6-1]
The Naval Supply Systems Command provides procurement
policies and administrative guidelines for field contracting
activities as the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA) for
the Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS)
.
C. BUY OUR SPARES SMART (BOSS) PROGRAM
When the ten-point plan identified by Secretary
Weinberger on 25 July 1983 had been delivered to the service
secretaries and then disseminated throughout their echelons,
it became apparent that the plan was open to various
interpretations and means of implementation. In the Navy,
the systems commands began formulating and issuing guidance
in the form of messages and formal plans of action as early
as 15 days following the announcement of the ten-point plan.
The guidance and direction was as diverse as the systems
commands themselves. On 17 August 1983 a letter from the
Chief of Naval Material to the systems commands,
referencing the Secretary of Defense memo of 25 July,
directed the addressees to immediately implement eight
courses of action to ensure that the taxpayer's money would
not be wasted. Of particular interest was the third course
of action. It required all Navy contracting offices to
include in bold print on the cover sheet of all documents or
solicitations for/or containing spare parts requirements the
following statement:
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Caution to offerors: No contract will be awarded under
this solicitation at greater than fair and reasonable
prices. [Ref. 16]
This appeared to be a tactic to quickly minimize future
"horror stories" and buy some time to establish long term
solutions. These long term solutions were already underway
at NAVSUP under then COMNAVSUP Rear Admiral A. A. Giordano,
SC, USN and became formalized in late August 1983 under the
aegis of the BOSS Program.
On 1 September 1983, slightly over one month after the
announcement of the Secretary of Defense ten-point plan,
Admiral Steven A. White, USN, Chief of Naval Material,
formally announced a spare parts pricing initiative called
project BOSS (Buy Our Spares Smart) . The key elements of
project BOSS reflected the Navy's commitment to represent
the U.S. taxpayer's interest and insist on spare parts
prices that were fair and reasonable. The project
implemented Secretary of Defense Weinberger's ten-point
spare parts procurement policy and encompassed numerous
individual initiatives focused on all aspects of the
acquisition process. The theme of the project was to insure
the proper utilization of the Federal Supply System assets
while concurrently reducing the cost of those parts which
are bought. Good business judgment and the test of
reasonableness were the key concepts underlying Project
BOSS. Some of the major objectives in obtaining significant
savings were to break the hold of weapon systems prime
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contractors over the secondary spare parts market and to
increase competition. Also, action was identified to
sensitize Navy users to the cost of the parts they order so
that they may assist in identifying unreasonable prices.
1. BOSS Initiatives
The major thrust of Project BOSS was to identify and
institutionalize the changes necessary to enable the Navy to
buy high quality spare parts at fair and reasonable prices.
[Ref. 9:p. 1] However, because the spares acquisition
process was very complex, the Navy simplified the focus of
the program by identifying three interdependent goals to
ensure that spares and other support items were bought at
reasonable prices. The three goals were:
- Breakout parts and equipment from prime contractors.
- Significantly increase the use of competitive
procurement
.
- Pay only fair and reasonable prices.
There are many elements to each of the above stated
goals. Most of those elements were recognized in the 3 5
initiatives included in Secretary Weinberger's memoranda of
25 July and 29 August of 1983 as identified in Appendix A.
The Navy implemented the SECDEF directives through over 100
individual initiatives which attack all aspects of the
spares acquisition problem. Today, BOSS encompasses 126
initiatives which incorporates not only the DOD 3 5-point
program, but also audit findings, legislation, and other
recommendations which are designed to improve the spares
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acquisition process (Appendix B) . Thus, BOSS is the Navy-
vehicle for tracking and monitoring a wide variety of
continuing initiatives in many functional disciplines.
Through FY86, of the 126 initiatives identified, 88
have been completed, 29 are still open, 5 are cancelled, and
4 are continuing. [Ref. 10 :p. 25]
2 . BOSS Program Organization
When Project BOSS was announced, it laid the
groundwork for essentially changing the way the Navy does
business. By channeling resources towards attaining the
three interdependent goals of the BOSS Program, the Navy
hopes to institutionalize the purchase of high quality
spares at fair and reasonable prices. Looking more
specifically at the three interdependent goals, the first
goal is: breakout parts and equipment from prime
contractors. Even though a DOD breakout program has been in
existence for more than 2 years, implementation has proven
to be a complex and lengthy ordeal requiring revitalization
by Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) Supplement No. 6.
[Ref. l:p. 27] Breakout is the process of improving the
competitive status of replenishment spare parts through the
identification and development of other qualified sources.
Direction and guidance in this effort is provided in the DAR
Supplement No. 6. The objective of the program is to reduce
costs by breakout of consumable or repairable replenishment
spare parts from other than the prime system contractor
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while maintaining the integrity of the system and the
equipment within which the parts will be utilized. The
program calls for the Government to apply sound engineering
and business management in decisions involving the
feasibility and economic advisability for removing the
restraints to breakout and to competitive procurement
discovered during breakout screening.
Screening for breakout candidates is accomplished as
early as possible to determine the technical and economical
characteristics of a part which will affect it's potential
for breakout to competition. DAR Supplement 6 prescribes
effective utilization of resources in accomplishing breakout
and suggests the application of priorities in assuring the
concentration of breakout efforts of those parts which offer
the greatest potential for breakout and savings. Breakout
is divided into two processes: full screen and limited
screen reviews. Full screen breakout is applied to
replenishment parts, and is performed well in advance of a
planned procurement. Limited screen breakout is a review of
an item already in the procurement cycle that covers only
the essential points of data and technical evaluation. [Ref.
10]
During the provisioning process, the contractor
provides provisioning parts lists (PPLs) which identify
those initial parts the contractor recommends the Government
procure for fielding the system under production. [Ref.
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17 :p. 21] The Government evaluates the lists for need
utilizing maintenance records and simulation techniques in a
process called Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) . Once the
PPLs are validated, they can be screened for initial
assignment of spare part acquisition method codes (AMCs) and
acquisition method suffix codes (AMSCs) . The AMCs are
assigned by Government technical personnel to a part to
provide the contracting officer with summary information
concerning the acquisition method recommended and sources
which may be solicited during acquisition of the part. The
AMSCs are assigned to provide additional information about a
part such as engineering , manufacturing, and technical data.
The assignment of AMC/AMSCs takes into consideration all
available data on a part including the prime system
contractor's recommendations. These recommendations may
include contractor technical information codes (CTICs) which
provide information concerning technical data for the part.
Contractor recommendations for the assignment of AMC/AMSCs
are reviewed and are considered as recommendations and not
accepted at face value. [Ref. 18:p. S6-302]
The assignment of AMC/AMSCs includes the
establishment of dates for subsequent review and progressive
upgrade, if possible, of the competitive status of a part.
Competitive status is preferred followed by direct
procurement of a part from the actual manufacturer. In the
latest submission for revision of the DAR Supplement 6,
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procedures for conducting and funding reverse engineering
efforts are identified. Reverse engineering is utilized
when technical data is unavailable for an item with a
significant Annual Buy Value (ABV) but data suitable for
competition of future requirements may be acquired through
reverse engineering. A five million dollar program was
initiated in Fiscal Year 1985 and was expanded to ten
million dollars in Fiscal Year 1986. Under full screen
breakout, DAR Supplement No. 6 requires full screen reviews
of all replenishment spares with an ABV greater than $10,000
which are also coded for sole source procurement. A full
screen review entails a 65-step process including data
collection, data evaluation, data completion, technical
evaluation, and supply feedback. This process is to be
performed on items above the $10,000 threshold with a buy
forecasted over the next 12 months. The decision whether or
not to breakout the item is based upon technical data
available at the Inventory Control Point and the Engineering
Support Activity responsible for the life cycle management
of the part and its parent system. Full reviews are
initiated by the Inventory Control Points (the Navy Aviation
Supply Office and the Navy Ships Parts Control Center) and
breakout decisions are approved either at the Inventory
Control Point, the Engineering Support Activity or the
parent Hardware System Command (the Naval Air Systems
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Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command, or the Naval Warfare
Systems Command) . [Ref . 18]
Limited screen breakout can be performed by any
procurement activity which also has a technical section such
as the Inventory Control Points or the Naval Supply Centers.
The breakout decision is make by the procuring activity
based upon the data available to the technician on site, or
the data which can be furnished in a timely manner by the
customer. For this reason, limited screen breakouts usually
involve material which is not highly technical in nature and
for which it is readily apparent that the sole source
contractor adds no value to the product. [Ref. 18]
Since the inception of the BOSS Program, in August
of 1983, the Breakout effort has generated the greatest cost
savings. During Fiscal Year 1984, there were 5,189 items
screened with a 53% success rate (broken out to competition)
and accounted for approximately 8 0% of the cost savings
identified by the BOSS Program. In Fiscal Year 1985, there
were 10,711 items screened resulting in 6,225 items, or 58%
broken out to competition which resulted in approximately
59% of the cost savings effort. In Fiscal Year 1986, the
were 17,265 items screened resulting in 7023 items, or 41%
broken out to competition which resulted in approximately
56% of the cost savings effort. [Refs. 8,9,10] Clearly, at
the onset of the program, the breakout items were easily
identified and the savings were large. As the effort
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continues, the dollar savings will decline until an
equilibrium is reached where the level of effort applied to
the breakout matches the savings accrued.
The second goal is: significantly increase the use
of competitive procurement. The Navy program to enhance
competition had its official genesis in Executive Order
12352, signed by President Reagan on 17 March 1982. It
states in part 1 section d:
In order to ensure effective and efficient spending of
public funds through fundamental reforms in government
procurement, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. To make procurement more effective in support
of mission accomplishment, the heads of executive agencies
engaged in the procurement of products and services from
the private sector shall:
(d) Establish criteria for enhancing effective
competition and limiting noncompetitive actions.
These criteria shall seek to improve competition by
such actions as eliminating unnecessary government
specifications and simplifying those that must be
retained, expanding the purchase of available
commercial goods and services where practical,
using functionally-oriented specifications or
otherwise describing government needs so as to
permit greater latitude for private sector
response. [Ref. 19]
This goal was further reinforced in 1983 when a Navy
court case was finally decided after more than three years.
In his decision, the judge forcefully brought home a
fundamental but often overlooked principle of defense
procurement:
. . . the requirement to seek competition is a continuing
legal obligation, not just a platitude periodically dusted
off for seminars and conferences. The Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) , having the force and effect of law,
imposes on procurement officials not only the need to
challenge the legitimacy of every sole source procurement,
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but the obligation, whenever possible, to shift a
procurement from sole source to competition. [Ref. 20]
Routine procurement practices the Navy viewed as
proper and even patently sensible were viewed by a Federal
District Court as being so contrary to law as to demand
punishment.
With the passage of the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984, it appears that healthy competition has
encouraged better cost control, lower prices, improved
quality, timely delivery, and a stronger industrial base.
As competition gains momentum, contractors are being forced
to "sharpen their pencils."
An essential ingredient to competition in the Navy
has been the establishment of the Navy's Competition
Advocate Program. By statute and regulation, the Office of
the Navy Competition Advocate General is responsible for
"challenging barriers to and promoting full and open
competition" in procurement. To ensure program
credibility, Secretary Lehman appointed a Navy flag officer
as the first Navy Competition Advocate General. There are
over 2 50 Navy and Marine Corps Competition Advocates at
hardware systems commands, field contracting offices, and
requiring activities throughout the world. [Ref. 21: p. III-
6]
Project BOSS operates as the competition advocate
for the Naval Supply Systems Command. It monitors and
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guides the program within the Navy field contracting system.
As a competition advocate, NAVSUP is responsible for:
* Ensuring that opportunities for competition are not
lost or constrained due to limited or restrictive
requirements, unnecessarily detailed specifications, poor
procurement planning, or arbitrary action.
Reviewing requests for non-competitive procurement and
taking action to bring about competition in existing and
planned procurement.
* Tracking procuring activities' performance against Navy
competition goals.
* Reporting significant achievements in competing
contractual requirements
.




* Assisting procuring activities to provide competition
training for both procurement and requirement generating
personnel.
* Assisting activities to challenge unnecessarily
restrictive data legends.
* Assisting in efforts to solicit cooperation from
industry to increase competition. [Ref. 21:p. III-6]
To facilitate the competitive process, the Office of
the Competition Advocate General also reviews all
Justification and Approval (J&A) documents supporting other
than full and open competition for procurements over $10
million. The success rate of the competition effort under
the BOSS Program has been considerable as identified in
Table 2: [Ref. 10:p. 3]
The third goal is: ensure that we pay only fair and
reasonable prices. Project BOSS applies five primary
techniques in assuring that prices are fair and reasonable:
PRICE FIGHTER "should cost" analysis, the Navy Pricing
Hotline, voluntary refunds, improved use of the supply
system, and validation of requirements. [Ref. 10: p. 17]
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TABLE 2






Inventory Control 33.8% 40.9%
Points •
Regional Contracting 42.3 58.2 60.0 69.8
Centers
Supply Centers 67.0 73.4 86.0 89.9
Laboratories 44.9 57.5 67.2 71.9
Supply Depots 78.9 84.4 88.0 95.7
All Others 42.2 63.1 77.5 82.4
Total NFCS 32.4% 46.8% 53.2% 64.0%
Source: FY86 BOSS Annual Report
a. PRICE FIGHTER
This is the name given to a small group of
engineers, technicians and pricing specialists, operating
out of NSC Norfolk, performing "should cost" analyses on
Navy spare parts. Target prices established by PRICE
FIGHTER are used by procurement personnel as negotiating
tools when contracting for an item. Candidates for PRICE
FIGHTER review are predominately parts that have a high
probability of being overpriced, as well as items identified
through the pricing Hotline. During Fiscal Year 1986, PRICE
FIGHTER performed a complete analysis on 2,923 line items,
including a review of all available drawings and technical
data, and physical examination of the part. Of the 2,923
items subjected to this detailed analysis, 822 were judged
to be reasonably priced and 2,101 exceeded their target
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price. The Navy's Inventory Control Points have used this
information to avoid over $8.9 million in costs. [Ref.
10:p. 17]
b. Pricing Hotline
The Pricing Hotline was established in 1979 at
the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) to receive customer
reports of suspected overpricing and to ensure that each
complaint was properly investigated. The Hotline is based
on the premise that operating, repair, and maintenance
personnel are in an excellent position to know the intrinsic
value of spare parts. Since its reemphasis in 1983, over
20,000 items have been identified as having suspect prices.
Of the 13,630 cases closed in Fiscal Years' 1984-86, there
have been price adjustments taken on 28% of the National
Stock Numbers (NSN's) reported by the operational community.
Where overpricing was revealed, refunds totalling over
$845,000 have been received by the Navy, DLA and GSA as a
result of investigations initiated subsequent to a hotline
call. [Ref. 10:p. 19]
c. Refunds
In those instances where excessive prices are
being charged for spares, the Navy is making an aggressive
effort to obtain voluntary refunds from contractors.
Refunds in Fiscal Year 1986 totaled $2,405,900 compared to
$1,150,900 in Fiscal Year 1985. [Ref. 10:p. 19] Defense
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contractors are fully cognizant of the Navy's aggressive
commitment to paying only fair and reasonable prices.
d. Challenging Requirements
By using their experience, contracting officials
and technicians are able to challenge requirements
containing unnecessarily restrictive specifications that can
only be met by a single source and are also capable of
challenging specifications that exceed the actual
requirement. These challenges to the customer have resulted
in development of specifications which meet actual needs at
a lesser cost, often by competing the procurement rather
than using sole source.
e. Procurement of Spares Concurrent with Production
of End Items.
Both Navy ICP's are working closely with related
Hardware Systems Commands to integrate the purchase of
spares for new systems with the production of those same
components for installation in the end item. The program,
called the Spares Acquisition Integrated with Production
(SAIP)
,
resulted in a cost avoidance in excess of $44
million. This sensible approach to spares procurement is
likely to save the Navy billions of dollars. [Ref. 10:p.
23]
Through these interdependent goals, the Navy
seeks to institutionalize the BOSS Program Initiatives
ultimately allowing the purchase of high quality spare parts
at fair and reasonable prices. [Ref. 10:p. 1]
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3. Institutionalizing Change
To ensure long-term institutionalization of the
changes brought about by the BOSS program, financial and
management commitments must be maintained in future years.
Effective management requires a high level of support, both
up and down the command chain, if there is to be continued
success in competition, breakout and fair and reasonable
prices. The responsibility for managing the Navy spares
competition program and Project BOSS belongs to the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) . To ensure that concepts of
BOSS are "institutionalized" throughout the Navy and will
survive the test of time, NAVSUP evolved a set of management
strategies with the following objectives in mind:
-Integrating the major initiatives related to improving
spares acquisition into a coordinated program (BOSS)
.
-Improving the communication links between engineering,
technical personnel responsible for spares design and
quality, and the supply/procurement personnel
responsible for spares procurement/competition.
-Convincing industry of its role in helping to solve the
problems and encouraging specific action on its part to
improve spare competition.
-Accelerating the introduction of technology into those
spares acquisition functions that can significantly
benefit in terms of reducing administrative lead times
and improving accuracy.
-Incorporating the acquisition reforms stemming from the
BOSS program into the normal organization
(institutionalization). [Ref. 22:p. 8]
To facilitate the implementation of these strategies
and protect them from organizational pressures, a program
office (PML550) was created at NAVSUP to be accountable for
strategy in terms of the specific initiatives and the
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results. PML550 was created in October 1984 by
consolidating the organizational elements which had
initiated various pieces of the BOSS Program with the
advanced logistics technology effort which priced BOSS.
This resulted in a "cradle-to-grave" coverage of major
initiatives affecting spares.
The charter for PML550 is identified in NAVSUPINST
5400.10 dated 22 May 1985. The organization of PML550 is
identified in Figure 1 and the majority of the BOSS Program
effort is contained within the first four branches; PML
5501, 5502 , 5503 , and 5504. The program management office is
identified to have a finite life and the need for its
continuation is to be periodically revalidated by SECNAV
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Shipbuilding and Logistics
(ASN(S&L). In Fiscal Year 1986, PML550 was funded through
Fiscal Year 1991. The funds finance a combination of
civilian end strength, contractor work years and non-labor
support items (e.g., training and technical data). The
spread of funds and end strength are reflected in Table 3:
[Ref. 10:p. 29]
The result of these efforts have been significant
cost avoidances. Since the BOSS Program operates on a
Return on Investment (ROI) justification, the past cost
avoidances have more than justified the continued existence
of the project. The cost avoidances are reflected in Table
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FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
NAVAIR 20.4 29.3 34.4 35.0 35.3 3 5.3
NAVSEA 26.2 42.5 42.8 40.6 48.4 49.3
SPAWAR 5.7 . 12.7 13.3 12.1 11.7 11.0
NAVSUP 34.4 48.4 60.9 61.9 61.6 63.5
FLEETS 0.0 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
TOTAL 86.7 133.6 152.8 151.0 158.4 160.5





NAVAIR 331 320 320 320 320 320
NAVSEA 175 241 391 391 391 391
SPAWAR 28 27 27 27 27 27
NAVSUP 405 685 685 685 685 685
FLEETS 45 45 45 45 45
TOTAL 939 1318 1468 1468 1468 1468
Source: FY8 6 BOSS Annual Report.
Clearly Project BOSS has paid its own way much as
would be expected of any efficient business. However, many
of the big savings identified early on in the program are
becoming harder and harder to find and eventually the
program will be faced with a diminishing ROI. It then
becomes imperative that the cost saving actions become




SUMMARY OF PROJECT BOSS COST AVOIDANCE
($ MILLIONS)
Project BOSS
FY84 FY85 FY8 6 Cumulative
Breakout $154.8 $192.7 $212.7 $560.2
Competition $ 21.3 $101.1 $113.0 $235.4
PRICE FIGHTER $ .5 $1.5 $'6.9 $8.9
Spares Acquisi-
tion Integrated
with Production $ 15.9 $ 25.5 $ 44.7 * $ 86.1
Economic Order
Qty - $6.6 $1.6 $8.2
Refunds $. J5 $ 1.2 $ 2.4 $ 4.1
Total Cost
Avoidance $193.0 $328.6 $381.3 $902.9
Less Investment $ 35.0 $ 66.0 $ 86.7 $187.7
Net Cost
Avoidance $158.0 $262.6 $294.6 $715.2
Source: FY86 BOSS Annual Report.
D. SUMMARY
The "horror stories" of spare parts pricing in 1983
forced increased attention by the services to correct their
buying practices. In July of 1983 the Secretary of Defense
issued a ten-point plan of action in an attempt to correct
those problems. This was followed in August by 25 addition
initiatives. The Navy/ in an effort to focus the management
attention required and justify the resource dollars needed,
created the BOSS Program which incorporated 12 6 initiatives
consisting of the 35 DOD initiatives and an additional 91
initiatives from internal Navy audits and inspections. The
use of the BOSS Program as a vehicle to institutionalize
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those initiatives has proven to be effective and has
resulted in substantial savings for the Navy.
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III. PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES
A. CURRENT STATUS OF THE BOSS PROGRAM INITIATIVES
Due to the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process,
the probability existed that BOSS Program resources would be
bled off to other functions before reaching the procurement
and technical operations for which the funds had been
targeted. At most activities, the Commanding Officer has a
considerable amount of latitude in the distribution of funds
within his organization. If the Commanding Officer felt
that some of the BOSS Program funds would better serve his
organization by directing most of those funds into the
inventory branch, he had the discretionary authority to
distribute the funds accordingly. However, NAVSUP
anticipated this possibility and to ensure the BOSS Program
funding to the field activities was primarily for the
procurement process, the funding was fenced around BOSS
billets as a reimbursable expenditure. [Ref. 23] As a
result, NAVSUP was able to institutionalize the billets
required to perform the BOSS Program objectives. The number
of billets required to perform BOSS functions were targeted
by each of the field activities and submitted to PML-550 for
approval and subsequent reimbursable funding for their
effort. This method of funding has been in effect until
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recently. The budget for FY 87 provides direct funding vice
reimbursable funding. [Ref. 23]
Currently, much of the determination of the
resource/budget dollars to be provided to an activity
depends on its return on investment (ROI) dollars which is a
more business like method of measuring the cost of the BOSS
Program effort versus the returns on savings achieved. [Ref.
24] In order to make ROI a credible figure, an analysis by
the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) in 1984 in
conjunction with OP-91 (Analysis Side Budgeting) resulted in
identifying the BOSS Program as real and that the savings
were auditable. [Ref. 10] As identified in Table 4 in
Chapter II, the savings were real and the ROI was
approximately 5 to 1 during FY 86. Based on the information
presented thus far, one might conclude that the supporting
mechanisms or resources appear to be effectively in place
and/or institutionalized. However, based on the recent
change to direct funding, a local Commanding Officer may see
fit to divert those resources to other areas outside the
procurement arena. Clearly, the reimbursable funding
process institutionalized the billets required to perform
the BOSS Program objectives. The question that remains is
under direct funding will those billets be incorporated into
the fabric of the organization and become part of the norm
or will they be subjected to the pressures of tight budget
constraints within the parent activity?
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The reinforcing mechanisms such as regulations,
directives, instructions and programs have been the second
most important factor in the effectiveness of
institutionalizing the BOSS Program initiatives. Many of
the initiatives have been included as clauses in the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) such as:
- Review of price increases greater than 25% or more on
an annualized basis.
- Encourage contractors to tell us when we are not
buying an economical order quantity.
- Mandatory Refunds clause.
- Encourage contractors to identify items which they do
not make or add no value. [Ref. 23]
Whether the institutionalization of an initiative is
through a regulation, directive, instruction, or program,
the test to determine if further impetus from headquarters
is necessary is determined by answering three basic
questions:
First—what was the initial objective?
Second—has that objective been accomplished?
Third—if it were to be dropped as an initiative, what
impact would there be on the continued performance towards
that objective?
If these three tests are answered, the decision as to
whether an initiative has been institutionalized or not is
straightforward. The next issue to address is the status of
the BOSS initiatives.
Of the 126 initiatives identified within the BOSS
Program, three interdependent goals were identified:
Breakout, Competition, and Fair and Reasonable Prices. A
further breakdown of the BOSS Program initiatives reveals
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the following action catagories: Requirements Determination,
Breakout, Competition, Method of Procurement, Pricing, Price
Surveillance, Contract Management, Training, Automated
Systems, Resources. These categories are discussed in the
following paragraphs (See Appendix B for detail) . [Ref . 10]
1. Requirements Determination (RD)
This category has nine internal actions designed to
review and improve the provisioning process since it is the
first step in establishing prices for future buys. For
example, Initiative R-001 requires review of contractors'
support packages. One of the steps has been to eliminate
common use items from support packages provided by
contractors. Many items such as hand tools are provided
with repair kits at excessive prices because of uneconomical
quantities ordered and the uniqueness of the kit. The Navy
is attempting to change this process and utilize the Navy
Supply System where possible. BOSS personnel are reviewing
contractor provided packages and purging unnecessary items
from the package. This initiative is one of the four that
have not been completed within this category.
Another example is RD-003 which is a review of
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) Models. The goal is to review
EOQ models used by the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and the
Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) to ensure that small,
repetitive buys are combined into larger more economical
procurements where possible. This is one of the completed
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initiatives in this category. Of the nine Requirements
Determination initiatives, six have been completed and three
are still outstanding.
2. Breakout (B)
There are 34 initiatives within this category.
Breakout is a review of sole source coded items to determine
whether it can be obtained from a contractor other than the
prime. For example, B-004 identifies the need to fund the
required data for reprocurement during the Integrated
Logistics Support (ILS) phase of major systems acquisitions.
This initiative has not been completed due to the complexity
of the issue. The question of how much data is enough and
how much we are willing to pay for that data makes this
initiative difficult to solve.
On the other hand, B-001 requires implementation of
the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) Supplement No. 6 at
the ICP's and Hardware Systems Commands (HSC's). This was
accomplished in June 1983 and is currently undergoing a
revision. [Ref. 25] Of the 34 Breakout initiatives, 25




Almost every aspect of Project BOSS touches on
competition in one form or another. An example initiative
in this category is C-007 which requires the appointment of
a Competition Advocate at all activities with $25,000
procurement authority and a "Competition Advocate of the
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Quarter" award program. This completed initiative required
the field activity's Competition Advocate to set up a review
board to screen and challenge every proposed sole source
procurement. Of the 16 Competition initiatives, 14 have
been completed and two were cancelled.
4
.
Method of Procurement (MP)
This category deals primarily with cost reducing
techniques already available to procurement personnel but
not implemented to the maximum extent possible. An example
of a completed initiative is MP-005 which seeks the expanded
use of multi-year procurement. Multi-year procurement is a
means of obtaining more than one year, but less than five
years, requirements in a single procurement. There are six
criteria multi-year candidates must meet. The main opponent
of the multi-year concept is Congress since it restricts
their ability to authorize and appropriate funds each year.
It also obligates DOD to a long term commitment which has
severe financial penalties if the Government decides to
cancel the program. Of the six Method of Procurement
initiatives, all six have been completed.
5. Pricing (P)
This category has 14 initiatives designed to
research and investigate overpricing of spare parts.
Completed initiative P-013 sought increased awareness of the
Price Fighter mission. As a result, the Navy's Inventory
Control Points have avoided over $8.9 million in costs
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during FY 86, a 400% increase in savings from FY 85. [Refs.
9,10] Of the 14 Pricing initiatives, 13 have been
completed and one is being continued. A continued
initiative is usually one in which the original objective
has been satisfied but that objective has been expanded
somewhat and or the initiative requires continued
monitoring.
6. Price Surveillance (PS)
Similar to the Pricing category, Price Surveillance
is designed to research and investigate overpricing of spare
parts but with an emphasis on the methods of detection. For
example, initiative PS-005 requires NAVSUP to develop the
capability to perform should cost analysis of material to
identify items which are overpriced. This was completed
with the establishment of the Price Fighter unit in Norfolk.
However, this initiative is different than P-013 which
sought increased awareness of the Price Fighter mission. Of
the 20 Price Surveillance initiatives, 15 have been
completed, three have been cancelled, and two are being
continued.
7. Contract Management (CM)
This category has seven initiatives that concentrate
on contract clauses that will facilitate reduced spare parts
prices. One of the major completed initiatives in this
category was the required value engineering clause in all
contracts for other than standard commercial spare parts and
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repair kits costing $25,000 or more. Value engineering has
two main goals. First, a review of overly complicated
specifications is made by engineers and, where applicable,
data are revised to allow for a competitive procurement.
Secondly, a value engineering review eliminates common-use
items from kits that are readily available from commercial
sources or the Navy Supply System. Of the seven Contract





Renewed emphasis was placed on training and many of
the goals of the BOSS Program have been emphasized in
training sessions. For example, completed initiative T-004
requires every 1102 series procurement specialist to take a
cost/price analysis course every three years in order to
keep current with cost/price analysis techniques. Of the
five Training initiatives, all five are completed.
9. Automated Systems (AS)
This category is designed to increase the automation
of the procurement process at Inventory Control Points
(ICP's), Stock Points (SP's), and Naval Regional Contracting
Centers (NRCC's). These initiatives address the issue of
automating the administrative process via the Automation of
Procurement and Accounting Data Entry (APADE) System and the
automation of data repositories via the Engineering Data
Management Information and Control System (EDMICS) . For
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example, initiative AS-001 requires the increased automation
of the procurement process. While this is still listed as
an incomplete initiative, the APADE Program has clearly
satisfied the basic objective of the initiative. Of the six
Automated Systems initiatives, one is complete and five
remain outstanding.
10. Resources (R)
This category identifies initiatives that reallocate
resources as necessary to enhance the BOSS Program
objectives. For example, completed initiative R-001
required the increase of resources (funds/end strength) to
enhance competition and pricing at NAVSUP activities to buy
spares more effectively. Of the nine Resource initiatives,
all nine have been completed.
To summarize, of the 126 BOSS Program initiatives,
there are 18 that remain outstanding and three that are
being continued. [Ref. 26] Of the 19 outstanding
initiatives, 15 or approximately 79% deal with the
categories of Breakout or Automated Systems. More
specifically, ten or 53% of the outstanding initiatives deal
with the Breakout category alone as identified in Appendix
B.
B. FIELD ACTIVITY ISSUES
1. Inventory Control Points
Within the Inventory Control Points (ICP's), the
majority of BOSS dollars spent and savings realized are the
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result of the breakout process. [Ref. 10: p. 31] Hence,
the Breakout category has historically held the greatest
number of initiatives and currently accounts for 53% of the
remaining initiatives.
The Breakout function within the NFCS has existed
for many years. Both major ICP's have been performing the
majority of the breakout functions and since the
implementation of DAR Supplement No. 6, have intensified
those efforts. The Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , can
make breakout and competition decisions on some 90% of the
240,000 items which it procures; the remaining 10% are
flight critical and subject to review by the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) . [Ref. 27:p. 20] With the
assistance of the prime contractor, ASO assigns an initial
acquisition method code to an item. Parts receive a code
that either restricts reprocurement to the prime
manufacturer or allows direct purchase only upon approval
from the command's engineering staff, permitting the
acquisition code to be changed. This process ensures that a
new manufacturer's proposed part will meet the same
operational and safety requirements as the original part.
The decision authority granted ASO by NAVAIR to make
decisions on 90% of the line items carried reflects an
excellent working relationship between the two activities.
This reduces the amount of breakout approval packages that
must be submitted to NAVAIR and subsequently reduces the
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timetables for completion. Of the breakout packages for
flight critical items submitted to NAVAIR, ASO has a very
high percentage of acceptance. [Ref. 28] At SPCC however,
breakout and competition decisions on sole source items are
made by NAVSEA with little authority on the part of SPCC.
Currently SPCC assembles the breakout candidate packages and
submits them to NAVSEA for approval. SPCC has a much lower
percentage of acceptance than ASO and this is in large part
due to the lack of engineers at NAVSEA required to
accomplish the job. While ASO has, over the years,
assembled a cadre of technical engineers, SPCC has not.
Additionally, there appears to be a closer working
relationship between ASO and NAVAIR than exists between SPCC
and NAVSEA. The result has been a more successful breakout
program at ASO with some innovative techniques to facilitate
the process.
Considering the nine outstanding initiatives within
the Breakout category, ASO is currently institutionalizing
several of their own. By directly tapping into Sikorsky's
computer system, ASO is able to identify the prime's
procurement sources for material. Working with other large
prime contractors, ASO hopes to achieve real time access to
the procurement sources of those prime contractors in an
effort to facilitate the breakout selection and source
identification process. [Ref. 28] When asked about
institutionalizing the BOSS initiatives, most of the ICP
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personnel interviewed felt that the breakout and competition
initiatives had been institutionalized within their
organization. In most cases, regulations, directives, or
local instructions were referenced as proof of
institutionalization. In addition, specific billets within
the command were referred to as BOSS billets. Incumbents
perform functions directly related to BOSS initiatives.
2 . Naval Supply Centers and Navy Regional Contracting
Centers
The breakout efforts within these activities is
considerably less than those of the ICP's. The majority of
the effort towards integrating the BOSS initiatives is
through competition. Additionally, while nearly 50% of the
outstanding initiatives can be attributed to the Breakout
category, another five, or 28% of the outstanding
initiatives are attributed to the Automated Systems
category. APADE, an integrated, self-contained program,
provides a standardized procurement system that automates
the total acquisition process from requisition input to the
completion of an awarded contract. It is designed to
improve the Navy Supply System's response to shore and fleet
activities with increased effective and efficient
procurement services. Ret. 29: p. 39]
Applications in the APADE system are categorized
into seven functional areas that will be implemented in five
distinct phases during the course of the APADE Project.
Table 5 summarizes the breakdown of functional areas and the
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phases of the project in which they will be implemented.
Each phase integrates a new application feature as they
become available. APADE is taught in modules which include,
Introduction to Personal Computers, Requisition Input,
Inquiry, Requisition Update, Awards, Military Standard
Contract Administrative Procedure (MILSCAP) , Reports, and
Managing in the APADE environment. [Ref . 30 :p. 1]
TABLE 5
FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF APADE AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION PHASES
Functional Area Phase (s)
Requisition Input/Update Processing 1/2,3
Pre-Award Processing 2,3,4,5
Award Processing 1,4,5
Contract Management Processing 3,4,5
Inquiry Processing 1,2,3,4,5
Report Processing 1,2,3,4,5
System Management Processing 1,2,3,4,5
Source: Navy's APADE Orientation Guide
Although originally targeted for implementation at
eight NSC's, and four NRCC's, APADE Redesign II identified
an additional twenty-two potential activities that which
would significantly benefit from an automated procurement
system. Figure 2 provides the initial implementation
schedule and milestones for FY 85-88.
While still in early implementation phases, the
automated procurement system and data management system are
firmly entrenched and will continue in the absence of the
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Source: Navy's APADE Orientation Guide
Figure 2. Navy's APADE Orientation
BOSS Program. In fact, as stand alone programs, APADE and
EDMICS appear to satisfy the objectives of many of the
outstanding Automated Systems initiatives.
As with the ICP's, many of the personnel interviewed
felt that the BOSS initiatives were adequately incorporated
into the fabric of their organization through various
regulations, directives and instructions. However, most
activities indicated that approximately 50% or less of the
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BOSS personnel were performing just BOSS related functions.
Many of those interviewed felt that BOSS funding provided
the means for ensuring quality contracts. As a result,
approximately 50% of the BOSS funded billets are performing
contract buying and administration jobs. This is not to say
that the BOSS Program objectives are not being followed,
rather it indicates that a significant part of increasing
competition is acquiring the manpower needed to accomplish
these goals.
C. GENERAL ISSUES
The researcher, through visits and phone conversations
with numerous field activities, asked several key questions
concerning the integration of the BOSS initiatives. The
first question dealt with the current status of
institutionalization within their own activity. The
responses were varied, but the majority referenced current
directives, regulations, and local instructions as evidence.
Many identified specific billets and a couple of activities
identified their own initiatives to enhance breakout,
competition, or automated systems in addition to those
identified by the BOSS Program.
The second question dealt with essential requirements
for integrating BOSS initiatives. The answers were
surprisingly similar in that they centered around two
issues; funding and visibility. The funding issue was the
most predominate as a decrease in funding would mean
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compromising many of the initiatives. One person stipulated
that if the funding was not protected in some manner,
contracting activities would return to their old ways. In
effect, competition would fall victim to sole source and the
sweat shop tactics of completing as many contracts as
possible, without regard to quality, would return. All
those interviewed felt that quality would definitely suffer.
The second issue dealt with visibility. Not everyone
felt as strongly about this issue but most of the
individuals interviewed identified the need for an
independent organization outside the activity's span of
control to ensure compliance with the BOSS initiatives.
Without such an organization, local commands would be
tempted to downgrade the importance of the BOSS initiatives
and prioritize efforts elsewhere.
A third question dealt with the finite life of PML-550
and if it no longer existed, what avenues should be utilized
to ensure continued leadership concerning BOSS initiatives.
From a funding aspect, most felt that the continued direct
funding would allow them to continue with the BOSS effort.
However, a few interviewees stipulated that the funding
would need to be a separate line item or a similar mechanism
to prevent: a "bleeding off" of those funds. One individual
suggested the funding could be incorporated into the
Productive Unit Resourcing (PUR) System currently being
implemented at many field activities. From a visibility
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aspect, approximately half of those interviewed thought the
responsibility for BOSS initiatives oversight should be
given to the Competition Advocate Program. Most of those
felt that it would require this kind of organization and
oversight to ensure the original intent of the BOSS
initiatives were being met. Additional concerns were that
funding for such efforts would not be diverted. The other
50% interviewed felt that the promulgation of directives and
regulations provided sufficient visibility and if properly
implemented would ensure continuation of the BOSS
initiatives.
D. SUMMARY
The BOSS Program is a mature program with only 19 of the
original 126 initiatives still outstanding. The majority of
the initiatives have been integrated into the working fabric
of the field activities through funding and various
regulations, directives, and instructions.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
A. ISSUES RELATED TO INSTITUTIONALIZING CHANGE
According to the "force field" theory of Kurt Lewin, any
behavior on the part of an individual or organization is the
result of an equilibrium between driving and restraining
forces. [Ref. 31] The driving forces push one way and the
restraining forces push the other. The result is often a
reconciliation of the two sets of forces. While Kurt Lewin
did not specify the military environment in particular, many
of the same factors in resisting change still apply. An
increase in a driving force may improve performance in a
specific area but at the same time, increase the restraining
forces elsewhere. For example, a contracting officer at a
Naval Supply Center believes he can improve the competition
statistics within his activity by telling his buyers that no
leave will be approved until a goal of 95% competition has
been achieved. While the goal of 95% may indeed be reached,
the likely negative response of distrust, hostility, and
greater resistance may manifest itself in other areas such
as reduced customer satisfaction statistics or increased
procurement acquisition lead times (PALT) . While it is
natural for most organizations to push for change there is
also an equal tendency to push back. Thus, driving forces
tend to activate their own restraining forces. However, if
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one were to decrease those restraining forces, a more
effective way to encourage change could be achieved. Kurt
Lewin's model (Figure 3), identifies that there are multiple






















Source: Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science.
Harpers and Brothers 1951.
Figure 3 . Kurt Lewin Model
Thus, as in the contracting example, the contracting
officer might get better results by first analyzing the
restrictions or barriers his buyers face in accomplishing a
95% goal.
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Lewin also noted that individuals experience two major
obstacles to change. First, they are unwilling or unable
to alter long established attitudes and behaviors. This can
be in the form of an untrained workforce that is resisting
automation. The second major obstacle is that change
frequently lasts only a short time. This problem is a major
concern of PML-550 and the BOSS Program. In short, what
measures can be taken to ensure the initiatives of the BOSS
Program continue in the absence of a Program Office?
A useful model developed by Edgar H. Schein identifies a
three step process in effecting organizational change. The
process involves "unfreezing" the present behavior pattern,
"changing" or developing a new behavior pattern, and then
"refreezing" or reinforcing the new behavior. [Ref. 32:pp.
243-247]
1. Unfreezing involves making the need for change so
obvious that the individual, group, or organization can
readily see and accept it.
2. Changing requires a trained change agent to foster new
values, attitudes, and behavior through the processes of
identification and internalization. Organizational
members identify with the change agents' values,
attitudes, and behavior, internalizing them once they
perceive their effectiveness in performance.
3. Refreezing means locking the new behavior pattern into
place by means of supporting or reinforcing mechanisms, so
that it becomes the new norm. [Ref. 32: pp. 243-247]
From the Navy's perspective, the unfreezing occurred
shortly after the reported "horror stories" in the
newspapers. The unfreezing was further reinforced by the 35
initiatives issued by the Secretary of Defense in an effort
64
to combat the spares parts pricing problems. Consequently,
the Navy had been sensitized to the problem and it was
obvious that action was necessary. The question then
became, what is the appropriate change agent? While there
were many ongoing initiatives to reduce spare parts prices
prior to the publishing of the "horror stories", there was
clearly little coordination between the efforts of each
initiative and lack of a single face to Congress and the
American taxpayers. Considering the number of initiatives
to be addressed and the need to place responsibility on one
organization, the BOSS Program was created. To ensure the
integrity of funding for the BOSS Program and the focus of
spare parts pricing actions, a separate Program Management
Office (PML-550) was created. Thus, the BOSS Program under
PML-550 became the change agent which fostered new values,
attitudes and behavior in the way the Navy conducts its
procurement business.
Considering the finite life of PML-550, the issue then
becomes the refreezing or locking in of the new behavior so
that it becomes the norm. Two principal components will
lock behaviors into place: supporting mechanisms and
reinforcing mechanisms. [Ref. 32:pp. 243-247]
Supporting mechanisms are usually in the form of
resources. In the case of the BOSS Program, a tremendous
amount of resources in terms of people and funds have been
utilized in accomplishing their goals/objectives. The
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additional resources were welcomed in an often overworked,
underpaid, and overclericalized field contracting system.
Many activities saw the BOSS Program as a source of funds to
offset local command budget constraints. The additional
management attention and performance requirements identified
by the BOSS Program would not have been possible if the
supporting mechanisms had not been provided. [Ref. 23]
The reinforcing mechanisms are the regulations,
directives, instructions, and programs that provide specific
guidance on policy implementation. These mechanisms can be
as broad or comprehensive as the Government's Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) or as specific as a Naval
Supply Center Instruction. [Ref. 32]
The success or failure of locking behaviors into place
is dependent on the organizational and individual resistance
to change. Table 6 developed by Kotter and Schlesinger
offer six ways of overcoming resistance to change. [Ref.
33:pp. 107-112]
In the Navy, the sixth approach (explicit and implicit
coercion) is generally used. While there is clearly a place
and time for explicit and implicit coercion within the
military, it should not be the standard course of business.
In the field of contracting, participation and involvement
of subordinate personnel is essential if the change



















0) u-j ^ >g































O P -H3 co 0)











aj jq ai as £
~ p 5 a) o
C -H O <-<



















































B. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
As identified earlier, there are two basic types of
institutionalization. The first utilizes support mechanisms
and the second uses reinforcing mechanisms.
1. Support Mechanisms
Looking first at the support mechanisms, the BOSS
Program provided resource funding as a reimbursable
expenditure to the field activities. This method was used
to ensure the survivability of the funding for its intended
use. This method has proven to be very successful in
targeting BOSS billets but is a time intensive method of
budgeting. In FY .87, BOSS resources changed from
reimbursable to direct funding. By doing so, there is less
visibility of the use of those funds. While it is clear
that at each activity the Commanding Officer should have
some autonomy over the distribution of funds within his
command, the question is how much autonomy. Part of the
problem for Commanding Officer's has been the lack of an
effective way of measuring efficiency versus cost for each
of his functional areas on an equitable basis.
An alternative support mechanism is to fold the BOSS
Program funding into the productive unit resourcing system
(PURS) . This system is currently being implemented within
the field activities. PURS is intended to provide the
Commanding Officer the ability to more readily detect
inefficiencies within his organization or supply direct
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funds where they are not only most needed, but more
importantly "best spent."
Under PURS, NAVSUP commits to funding the workload
at the required level of performance, i.e., all field
activities are funded on the basis of actual work performed
vice the fixed/cost funding methodology used previously. As
a result, the activity assumes the responsibility to reduce
the unit cost of processing work. By paying field
activities for work done on a productive unit basis, NAVSUP
expects to achieve substantial gains in workforce
productivity and economies through the use of a more
flexible workforce, performance based incentive systems, and
specifically defined performance goals and management of
overhead costs. [Ref. 34 :p. 1] The PUR system features the
following concepts in its operation:
a) Fixed or non-productive overhead type costs are
funded as an allocation.
b) To facilitate management of the system, the number
of cost centers is kept to a minimum and defined by
the activity's major mission operations.
c) All costs that can be reasonably and discretely
identified and are influenced by an activity's
workload fluctuations are funded under the rate for
a particular cost center.
d) Service type functions which do not have a definable
productive unit are distributed back to user cost
center to the maximum extent practicable using a
chargeback system.
e) All activity direct 0&M,N resources are managed
under the system.
f) All productive units generated by an activity are
assumed to be the result of mission operations
unless they can be tied to a specific reimbursement.
g) Generation of productive units as a result of
efforts to reduce a backlog that exists at the
beginning of a fiscal year must be justified to
NAVSUP on a cost-benefit basis prior to initiation
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of such efforts. Determination of what constitutes
an acceptable backlog for each activity will be made
and published prior to the start of a fiscal year.
[Ref. 34:p. 2]
As indicated by the third concept, a rate is
determined for different cost centers. The rate is
determined through negotiations between the activity and
NAVSUP headquarters and is published normally between 3-4
months prior to the start of the fiscal year. Currently,
activities are required to submit execution plans to NAVSUP
within 3 calender days after receipt of the official
Financial Operating Plan (FOP) . The plans are submitted as
monthly phasings under the categories of General and
Administrative Cost Center, Distributed Cost Center, and
Productive Cost Center (s) . Activity performance is measured
against monthly phasing plans on a monthly basis for all
cost centers as follows: [Ref.34:p. 5]
(1) For productive cost centers, funding adjustments
for workload gain and/or lapse and cost center
performance against planned rates will be calculated every
month. Adjustments to cost center planned resources will
be made quarterly. A NAVSUP matrix in NAVSUPINST
7000. 21A, details the profit/loss calculations that will
be employed to determine whether or not NAVSUP will pay
out or recapture resources.
(2) For distributed and G&A cost centers, actual
obligations will be compared to plan each month.
Variances exceeding ten percent will be reviewed with the
activity by the functional or cost center. TRef. 34: p.
5]
There are 15 principal cost centers. The
Procurement Cost Center is most affected by BOSS Program
resources. Within the Procurement Cost Center, the
productive unit is a weighted contract/purchase action which
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is reported on DF 106 and DFPUR57 Reports. The functions
managed under the Procurement Cost Center are Large and
Small Purchase Buying, Contract and Purchase Administration,
and Procurement Overhead. [Ref. 34:p. 27]
The principal benefit of Productive Unit Resourcing
is a much improved visibility over costs. Managers have an
increased awareness of the costs of doing business and take
cost/earnings into consideration when managing their
operations. As a result, functional managers and department
directors have a much greater involvement in matters
concerning budget execution. This cost/benefit awareness is
not far removed from the BOSS Program's ROI awareness in
that both measures are concerned with cost savings to the
Navy.
When questioned about funding the BOSS Program
effort in the future, all of the NFCS Procurement Managers
interviewed stipulated that the resources provided through
the program were essential to their procurement effort.
When asked if those funds could be folded into the PUR
system, the majority felt it could be efficiently
accomplished provided the rates were adjusted upward
accordingly.
Consider the BOSS funding for breakout provided to
field activities. Clearly, breakout as a functional
category utilizes a major portion of the BOSS Program
dollars but also has provided NAVSUP with the highest total
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savings. If funding for the breakout effort were to be
incorporated within the PUR System, the money could be given
as an increase in the PUR rate authorized by NAVSUP. While
this process might seem appropriate, it does have some
drawbacks. A major drawback is NAVSUP' s ability to adjust
the rate annually. During tight budget years, lack of
visibility of effort towards breakout would allow non-
expanding or even negative PUR rate growth that is not
indicative of the resources and effort being committed
towards breakout.
Since breakout usually deals with larger contracts,
it most often would fall within the Large Purchase
Production Unit Matrix identified in NAVSUPINST 7000. 21A,
Table 7.
By creating a breakout category within the Contract
Type column with manhours and productive unit weights
identified, the field activity performing the effort would
receive the appropriate credit for the level of effort
expended. This is an important issue if the breakout
process is truly to be institutionalized.
Similar problems with simply adjusting the PUR rate
for each activity will be experienced with the funding for
competition. The dollars identified will eventually lose
their identity and fall victim to arbitrary budget cuts.
However, as identified earlier, many activities have
utilized BOSS billets for competition in a generic sense.
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TABLE 7
LARGE PURCHASE PRODUCTION UNIT MATRIX
STANDARD PRODUCTIVE
CONTRACT TYPE MANHOURS UNIT WEIGHTS
Del Order/GSA/Other Fed Agencies 13 1
Sealed Bids 39 3
Unpriced BOA Orders 13 1
Initial Placement of BOAs/
Contracts & IDTCs <$25K 26 2
Definitized BOA Orders
25K to less than 100K 39 3
100K to less than 500K 143 11
500K to less than 1M 143 11
1M to less than 10M 182 14
10M and Greater 182 14
Negotiated Competitive Supply
25K to less than 100K 39 3
100K to less than 500K 52 4
500K to less than 1M 117 9
1M to less than 10M 182 14
10M and Greater 182 14
Negotiated Competitive Service
25K to less than 100K 52 4
100K to less than 500K 156 12
500K to less than 1M 156 12
1M to less than 10M 195 15
10M and Greater 195 15
Negotiated Sole Source/8A
25K to less than 100K 52 4
100K to less than 500K 156 12
500K to less than 1M 156 12
1M to less than 10M 195 15
10M and Greater 195 15
Source: NAVSUP Instruction 7000. 21A
In fact, over 50% of the people funded by BOSS perform
standard buying and contract administration functions.
Thus, rather than single out the specific individuals to
undertake the BOSS initiatives, everyone conducts more
research to ensure the highest degree of competition
possible.
73
This being the case, query why NAVSUPINST 7000. 21A
reflects greater manhours and larger productive unit weights
for Negotiated Sole Source than for Negotiated Competitive
Supply (Table 7)? The Navy's effort has been to increase
competition and if properly carried out, would require
greater effort to facilitate competition than sole source.
The current productive unit weights reward sole source
procurements and any activity tight on funding will tend to
award a sole source procurement rather than expend the
effort to make it competitive. If BOSS competition dollars
are to be effectively utilized, PUR standard manhours need
to be adjusted to accurately reflect the manhours to conduct
competitive awards under the BOSS Program objectives which
will reflect higher productive unit weights for Negotiated
Competitive Supply than for Negotiated Sole Source.
2. Reinforcing Mechanisms
Reinforcing mechanisms are the regulations,
directives, instructions, and programs the Navy utilizes to
disseminate its initiatives. Of the 126 initiatives
identified within the BOSS Program, virtually all deal with
competition in one form or another. In the absence of the
BOSS Program, it is important for a vehicle to exist that
can objectively target competition initiatives and monitor
effective implementation of those initiatives within the
Navy. Equally important is the reinforcement of recent
changes in the way the Navy conducts its procurement
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business. Today, such an organization exists and has been
mandated by law: the Competition Advocate Program. [Ref.
21]
Placing the outstanding BOSS initiatives under the
umbrella of the Competition Advocate Program would enhance
the institutionalization process. During FY 86, the
Competition Advocate Program made significant progress in
overcoming institutional bias favoring sole source
procurement. To help continue this progress, initiatives
called a Priorities Objectives Program have been developed
to enhance competition: [Ref. 21 :p. IV-2]
- Improve Early Planning for Competition
- Upgrade Market Research Activity
- Strengthen Best Value Concepts
- Implement Consistent Production Competition
- Apply Effective Cost and Benefit Models
- Apply Incentives for Industry Competitiveness
- Increase Coordination and Communication
- Reduce Procurement Leadtime
- Increase Functional Specialization and Training
- Provide Supplemental Procurement Information. [Ref.
2: p. IV-2]
Figure 4 lists the 34 initiatives included in the
Priority Objectives, as well as the 11 additional
competition-related objectives that the Office of the Navy
Competition Advocate General will monitor. [Ref. 21 :p. IV-








































































































Source: Navy Procurement Competition FY 1986 Report to
Congress
Figure 4. Navy Competition Advocate General
Priority Objectives
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with the majority of the effort remaining within the
Breakout and Automated Systems categories, it appears
feasible to incorporate the BOSS Program within the Priority
Objectives identified in Figure 4. In this situation, the
BOSS Program would become a .coordinated and facilitated
objective vice one that the Navy Competition Advocate
General only monitors.
This is further reinforced when one looks at the
organizational structure most field activities utilized to
implement the BOSS Program. In the case of the ICP's, the
existing structure reflects the BOSS Program as a functional
activity reporting to the Competition Advocate, figures 5
and 6. At many of the smaller field activities, the
Competition Advocate wears a second hat as the BOSS Program
manager.
C. SUMMARY
The majority of the BOSS Program initiatives appear to
have been successfully implemented. This has occurred
primarily through supporting mechanisms and reinforcing
mechanisms. Of the 126 initiatives identified, 19 remain in
an outstanding status with the majority concentrated within
the Breakout and Automated Systems category. Both of the
Breakout and Automated Systems categories are well
integrated into the fabric of the Navy's procurement process
and will continue provided the support and reinforcement
mechanisms continue. An alternative method of
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institutionalizing the BOSS Program initiatives is to
utilize the Productive Unit Resourcing System developed by
NAVSUP to provide the support mechanism. A second method of
institutionalizing the BOSS Program initiatives is to
incorporate the coordination and facilitation of the BOSS
Program initiatives within the Navy Competition Advocate





























































































































































































A. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
1. Support Mechanism
The previous chapter identified Productive Unit
Resourcing as a support mechanism and an alternate method of
institutionalizing BOSS Program initiatives. However, the
PUR System is not without its own problems. Much like the
BOSS Program, the PUR System faces resistance to change.
However, unlike most new programs, the PUR System is
structured to financially reward efficiency in operations.
The result is the PUR System is a new method of measuring
buying efficiency. Many of the procurement managers
interviewed were comfortable with the PUR System concept but
felt that there were several issues that needed to be
resolved before they would fully embrace the program.
To properly convey the concerns of the procurement
managers, a further explanation of the PUR System is
required. Concentrated within the Procurement Cost Center
are three principal cost pools. [Ref. 34 :p. 4]
1) General and Administrative. Principally includes
Contract Management Reviews (CMR's) and scheduled
training.
2) Small Purchase. Principally includes proportional
overhead costs, purchase administration, and small
purchasing buying.
81
3) Large Purchase. Principally includes large purchase
overhead costs, contract administration, and large
purchase buying. [Ref. 34 :p. 4]
When NAVSUP issues its Business Plan call letter to
the field activities, an explanation of the procedures to be
used in developing productive unit rates and workload
projections for the upcoming fiscal year is identified.
Once the workload projections for the year and the projected
costs are identified, the following simplified formulas are
used to determine productive unit rates: [Ref. 34: pp. 27-28]
Small Purchase Costs = Small Purchase Rate
Small Purchase Units
Large Purchase Costs = Large Purchase Rate
Large Purchase Units
The field activity must negotiate both the projected
costs and units with NAVSUP prior to the onset of the new
fiscal year. Once approved by NAVSUP, the field activity
receives quarterly funding at the approved rate.
[Ref. 34:p. 5]
According to NAVSUPINST 7000. 21A, the following
matrix (Figure 7) determines whether resources are provided
to or recaptured from NAVSUP field activities based on the
results of productive operations during a given quarter:
For example, an activity has been granted funding of
one million dollars during the fiscal year at increments of
$250,000 per quarter. The objective is to have the actual
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Source: NAVSUP Instruction 7000. 2 1A
Figure 7. NAVSUP Matrix
planned costs. In reality however, this will rarely be the
case. Most likely, there will be a variance in either the
work units, costs or both. If the planned work units and
the actual work units at the end of the quarter match, but
the costs are less than planned, the activity retains the
difference in funding. For example: if the costs were
$225,000 for the quarter and there was no variance in the
work units, the activity would retain $25,000 as a reward
for efficiency. However, this can be a double edged sword
as next year's funding may be adjusted downward accordingly.
If on the other hand, the activity produced more work units
than planned, the activity receives a funding supplement
based on the additional work units times the lower of the
planned or actual productive unit rate. The supplement
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which is audited by NAVSUP the month following the quarter
in question, is paid as an augment within the middle of the
following quarter. [Ref. 35]
Two issues identified during interviews arise from
this method of profit sharing. First is the requirement for
quarterly adjustment of planned versus actual figures. If
actual work units are greater than planned or actual costs
are less than planned, (i.e., the activity exceeded its
goals) , the ramifications are not as critical compared to
cases where actuals fell short of goals. Unlike general
trade personnel, such as lower level inventory warehousemen,
or traffic warehousemen, or non-specialized clerical
personnel, the procurement cost center utilizes highly
trained contracting personnel. If in one particular quarter
the results show less productivity than planned, it is
unrealistic to take certain actions to address the
shortfall, e.g., lay off trained procurement personnel. One
manager stated "the training required to perform contracting
actions is too extensive and can not be accomplished by
temporary personnel". Downward funding adjustments,
therefore should occur no more than semi-annually to
minimize disruption to an activity's procurement workforce.
The second issue identified deals with the profit
sharing reward for efficiency. As mentioned earlier, an
activity which manages to decrease the costs of performance,
can be penalized the following year for developed
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efficiencies in the current year. In the annual negotiation
process, there needs to be consideration of the factors
contributing to the efficiencies before a downward
adjustment of the activity's productive unit rate occurs.
In some cases, the increased efficiencies during the year
may be due to temporary changes and the savings may be short
lived.
Another issue of concern to procurement managers at
the NSC's and NRCC's is quality of the contracting product.
As the pressure to reduce productive units rates is applied,
do controls exist to ensure that BOSS Program objectives are
followed such as Breakout and Competition? Evidence of the
pressure to reduce the productive unit rates is visible in
the funding process for fiscal years 1985 and 1986. The
rates for FY 86 were determined by the actual costs for each
activity during FY 85. NAVSUP chose to use FY 85 as the
base year for PUR rate determination. In an effort to
increase efficiency, a 6.5% decrease in FY 85 base year
funding was provided for FY 86. [Ref. 35] While the
majority of the field level activities experienced few
problems in incorporating the PUR System and the funding
cuts, results do not show the compromised quality that may
have occurred to achieve those results. While Contract
Management Reviews (CMR's) help identify the quality of an
activity's procurement operation, the review is seldom
timely and often not sufficiently comprehensive.
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Considering the proposed decrease in funding of 8% for FY
88, the concern of many procurement managers and buying
personnel interviewed, is the ability to maintain a quality
product with continued budget cuts. [Ref . 35]
The funding associated with the BOSS program is
perceived by most procurement managers as the resources
required to provide quality contracting. Of the personnel
hired to fill BOSS billets funded at field activities, less
than 50% performed work exclusively related to BOSS
initiatives. In most cases, over 50% were additional buyers
in small and large purchasing. However, those additional
people enabled the procurement workforce to negotiate more
competitive/quality contracts without significantly
increasing PALT. If the BOSS Program funding is to be
included under the PUR System, it is essential that an
activity's productive unit rates and weights be
proportionately increased by the amount of BOSS Program
funding received and effort put forth in the past.
2 . Reinforcing Mechanism
The second alternative method of institutionalizing
the BOSS Program initiatives is to fold the remaining
initiatives into the Competition Advocate Program. Since
the majority of the BOSS Program deals with competition in
one form or another, accomplishment of the remaining
initiatives would not only seem appropriate but also reduce
overlap in the reporting and monitoring functions. The role
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of the Competition Advocate is to perform review and
oversight functions concerning the execution of statutes,
regulations, and policies affecting competition on a
systemic basis. As described by the Navy's Competition
Advocate General, Rear Admiral Stuart Piatt, SC, USN:
We have now begun to rapidly capitalize on our business
philosophy through the management infrastructure the Navy
has established. To keep pace with these improvements,
the Navy acquisition team will look to new methods to
replace and streamline the paper-intensive procurement
process. The advancement of Navy procurement automation,
if left unattended, will be a major barrier to successful
competition in the future. We will work to set in place
expert systems to reduce lead times in the procurement
process. Also, steps that capitalize upon defense
industry productivity and Navy competition will further
improve the acquisition process. We in the armed
services, through interactions with a segment of the U.S.
industrial base, increasingly find ourselves in a position
to aid our nation's worldwide competitiveness. [Ref.
21:p. vi]
By statute and regulation, the Navy Competition
Advocate General is responsible for "challenging barriers to
promoting full and open competition" in procurement. [Ref.
21:p. III-6] As a minimum, this requirement satisfies one
of the BOSS Program's interdependent goals, that of
significantly increasing the use of competitive procurement.
As previously identified, the majority (79%) of the
outstanding BOSS Program initiatives deal with the
categories of Breakout and Automated Systems. A review of
Figure 4 reflects the categories and objectives that are
monitored by the Navy Competition Advocate General. Within
the BOSS Program category, the objectives monitored are:
Acquisition Plans, Technical Documentation, Reverse
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Engineering, and Should Cost. The latter three objectives
deal specifically with Breakout. Under the Competition and
Technology category, the objectives monitored are, the Navy
Standard Technical Information System (NSTIS) , the Rapid
Acquisition of Manufactured Parts' (RAMP) Program, and the
APADE Program. [Ref. 21 :p. IV-3] Whether by accident or
design, the monitored categories of BOSS and Competition &
Technology identify objectives dealing with the majority of
the outstanding BOSS Program initiatives.
If the remaining BOSS initiatives are to be folded
under the Competition Advocate, some issues must be
considered. The first issue would be one of integration.
The majority of the BOSS initiatives have dealt exclusively
with spare parts. The Competition Advocate Program has
focused on a broader scope of objectives ranging from
competitive small procurements to major system acquisitions.
As a part of the Competition Advocate General priority
objectives, the possibility exists that the BOSS initiatives
will be overshawdowed or downgraded in importance. It is
difficult to determine if loss of a separate identity under
PML-550 will result in a diminished effectiveness of the
program. While the vast majority of the BOSS Program
initiatives have been institutionalized through regulations,
policy, instructions, and programs, there still remains a
requirement to monitor and update the various directives and
periodically audit for compliance. Considering the core of
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BOSS is to identify and institutionalize the program
initiatives, the majority of the BOSS effort has been
completed with only 19 of the original 126 initiatives in an
outstanding status. Most of those interviewed felt that
upon completion of the APADE Program implementation, the
majority of the Automated Systems initiatives will be
accomplished. The remaining initiatives deal principally
with Breakout.
Breakout crosses several boundaries in competition
and the savings generated need to be effectively weighed
against the costs of Breakout. Within the Navy Competition
Advocate General Priority Objectives, Breakout affects
several categories such as, Procurement Leadtime,
Competition Planning, Acquisition Streamlining, and
Production Competition. The ability to interact with the
other objective categories is important in order to minimize
suboptimization. For example, in the Production Competition
category , efforts to identify data rights should not be
undertaken without input from experienced personnel
conducting Breakout actions. Interviews identified
difficulties with the Breakout process which, while
important in determining data the Navy needs, is often
ignored during data decisions for major systems
acquisitions. Thus, some efficiencies through coordination
and lack of duplicated efforts can be achieved in folding
89
the remaining BOSS initiatives into the Navy Competition
Advocate General Priority Objectives.
B. SUMMARY
The PUR System can be an effective method of
institutionalizing the support mechanism of the BOSS Program
provided the funding integrity remains in the transfer
process. Once implemented, concerns include the effect
annual funding cuts will have on quality, the disruption of
the procurement workforce through quarterly recapture of
funds, and the double-edged sword reward for efficiency. By
statute and regulation, the Office of the Navy Competition
Advocate General has been created to challenge barriers to
full and open competition in procurement. With the BOSS
Program initiatives nearing completion, and with the overlap
in reporting and monitoring functions, it would be
appropriate to consider folding the maturing BOSS Program
into the Competition Advocate General Priority Objectives.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following conclusions, recommendations, and answers




The program management office (PML 550) has been an
effective vehicle for incorporating the BOSS initiatives .
PML 550 has provided centralized management and
coordination for over 126 initiatives designed to address
and solve problems in spare parts pricing. By using a
program management office, the BOSS initiatives have
received the visibility and resources needed to incorporate
reforms in logistics support provided to the operating
forces.
The use of reimburseable funding as the method of
providing BOSS resources to the NFCS has been effective .
As part of the scope of BOSS, PML 550 is responsible for
budgeting, allocating, and monitoring the utilization of all
resources (funds and manpower) assigned to NAVSUP for BOSS
efforts. The use of reimbursable funding was an important
step in forcing the field activities to utilize BOSS funding
for BOSS efforts.
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The BOSS Program is a mature program .
Of the 126 BOSS initiatives, only 19 remain in an
outstanding status and 3 in a continuing status. The
remainder have been completed, requiring only a monitoring
function.
Since the program management office (PML 550) will have
a finite life, alternative methods of integrating the BOSS
initiatives are required .
As identified in PML 550' s charter, the program
management office will eventually be disestablished. With
less than 20 remaining initiatives in an outstanding status,
a transition plan will soon be required to insure a smooth
disposition of the BOSS resources, responsibilities and
functions. The plan should to provide the means of locking
the new BOSS behaviors into place by means of supporting or
reinforcing mechanisms, so that it becomes the new norm.
As a support mechanism, the Productive Unit Resourcing
(PUR) System provides an alternative method of integrating
the BOSS resources (funds and manpower) .
Under PURS, NAVSUP commits to funding the workload at
the required level of performance, i.e., all field
activities are funded on the basis of actual work performed
vice the fixed/cosr funding methodology used in the past.
The principal benefit of PURS is the improved visibility
over costs. Managers will have an increased awareness of
the costs of Breakout and Competition and can take
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cost/earnings into consideration when managing their
operations. Also, functional managers and department
directors will have a much greater involvement in matters
concerning budget execution. This cost/benefit awareness is
not far removed from the BOSS Program ROI sensitivity in
that both measures are concerned with cost savings to the
Navy.
The Productive Unit Resourcing System (PURS) will
require revision to effectively incorporate BOSS Program
funding .
The current instruction, NAVSUPINST 7000. 2 1A, does not
recognize effort for Breakout and increased Competition, two
of the principal components of the BOSS Program and
Initiatives.
As a reinforcing mechanism, the Competition Advocate
Program provides an alternative method of integrating the
completion, monitoring and reporting of the BOSS Program
Initiatives .
The Competition Advocate Program, which is mandated by
law, provides a permanently established organization which
can incorporate future spare parts pricing initiatives as
well as completion, monitoring and reporting functions of
the BOSS Program Initiatives.
Authorization at the Inventory Control Points (ICP's) to
make Breakout decisions, which is provided by the Hardware
System Commands (HSC's) . differs dramatically .
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ASO has been provided Breakout authority on
approximately 90% of their line items with only 10%
requiring NAVAIR approval. SPCC, on the other hand, has
virtually no Breakout approval authority and must submit all
candidates to NAVSEA for approval. The result is a long and
drawn out administrative process on the part of SPCC with a
smaller Breakout success rate.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are relevant for this
research effort.
As a support mechanism, BOSS Program funding should be
incorporated into the Productive Unit Resource (PUR) System .
The PUR System provides a means for funding on the basis of
actual work performed vice the fixed/cost funding
methodology used in the past. The PUR System provides an
increased awareness of the costs of doing business and takes
cost/earnings into consideration when managing operations.
PURS can provide longevity to the BOSS Program initiatives
by providing continuing resources for BOSS efforts.
Additionally, the cost/earnings awareness generated by PURS
is not far removed from the ROI measures currently being
used to justify BOSS resources.
Modify the NAVSUP Productive Unit Resourcing Instruction
to adeguatelv reflect the efforts of Breakout and increased
Competition . Within Enclosure (3) of NAVSUPINST 7000. 21A,
the Large Purchase Production Unit Matrix should identify a
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Breakout category under the Contract Type column with
appropriate manhours and productive unit weights assigned.
In this way, the activity performing Breakout would receive
appropriate credit for the level of effort expended. In the
area of Competition, the Large Purchase Production Unit
Matrix should identify greater manhours and larger
productive unit weights for Competition (under the BOSS
Initiatives) than for Negotiated Sole Source. The Navy's
effort has been to increase competition and if properly
carried out, would require greater effort to facilitate
competition than to accomplish sole source procurement.
Modify the Productive Unit Resourcing Instruction to
require downward funding adjustments no more than on a
semiannual basis for the Procurement Cost Center . Unlike
semi-skilled to unskilled functional areas, the Procurement
Cost Center utilizes highly trained contracting personnel.
The use of temporary personnel is unrealistic in that
training alone would take several months and the
productivity demanded by the system may not be realized
until well into the future. To minimize disruption to the
Procurement Cost Center, the downward funding adjustment
should occur no more than semiannually.
As a reinforcement mechanism, the Competition Advocate
Program should incorporate the maturing BOSS Program and its
remaining initiatives . The finite life of PML 550 dictates
the need to identify an organization that can objectively
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focus on spare parts competition initiatives and effectively
monitor implementation of these initiatives within the Navy.
Since the Competition Advocate Program is mandated by law,
incorporating the remaining objectives and program oversight
within the Competition Advocate Organization would ensure
institutionalization. The BOSS Program, which essentially
involves competition from a spare parts perspective, is
currently under the organization of the Competition Advocate
at many of the NAVSUP field level activities. The impact of
this recommendation, therefore, should be minimal in most
cases and would more accurately reflect the current
organization. Additionally, since several of the
outstanding BOSS initiatives are already monitored as a
Priority Objective within the Competition Advocate Program,
the administrative vehicle to incorporate such a change
currently exists.
SPCC should be provided with a small group of Breakout
engineers similar to that at ASO and NAVSEA should provide
SPCC with authority to make Breakout and Competition
decisions . The result would be a reduction in the number of
Breakout approval packages that must be submitted to NAVSEA
and subsequent reduction in administrative costs and
timetables for completion. Approval of SPCC Breakout
proposals by NAVSEA is slow and costly. A group of
experienced engineers within the Breakout Division at SPCC
could provide credibility for Breakout decisions. Once
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accomplished, NAVSEA should establish criteria for Breakout
approval authority at SPCC.
The PRICE FIGHTER organization should remain a separate
entity . While interviewees at ASO felt a small contingent
of "should cost" engineers located at their office would be
advantageous, both ICP's felt the current PRICE FIGHTER
organization provides a valuable service towards the
Breakout effort and should remain a separate activity which
continues to provide "should cost" analyses to any
organization when requested.
C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was: What actions are
required to effectively incorporate the Buy Our Spares Smart
(BOSS) Program Initiatives into the Acquisition and
Logistics process?
The answer revolves around the methods of locking new
behavior patterns into place by means of supporting and
reinforcing mechanisms, so that it becomes the new norm.
The supporting mechanism is the PUR System with
modifications to the existing NAVSUP Instruction 7000. 21A.
The modifications include restructuring the Large Purchase
Production Unit Matrix to reflect a Breakout category under
the Contract Type column and an increase in the standard
manhours and corresponding productive unit weights.
The reinforcing mechanism is the Competition Advocate
Program. Since the majority of the BOSS Program deals with
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competition in one form or another, and the Competition
Advocate Program's mandate is to foster full and open
competition, accomplishment of the remaining initiatives
under the aegis of the Competition Advocate Program seems
not only appropriate, but will reduce overlap in the
reporting and monitoring functions.
The subsidiary questions were:
1. What are the BOSS Program's principal areas of concern
and what are its components, goals and objectives?
The BOSS Program consists of 126 initiatives broken down
into ten functional categories. The objective is to
integrate those initiatives into the procurement process
through attainment of three interdependent goals: breakout
of parts and equipment from prime contractors, significantly
increase the use of competitive procurement, and ensure that
we pay only fair and reasonable prices.
2. How are BOSS goals and objectives incorporated into
the Navy's Acquisition and Logistics process?
Most of the BOSS initiatives have been incorporated into
the procurement process through regulations, directives,
instructions, or other programs. Many of the initiatives
are now part of the FAR or the DFARS which guides the day to
day activity of procurement personnel.
3. How have the BOSS initiatives been implemented at
field activities?
As identified above, most of the initiatives are
incorporated into specific regulations, directives, or
instructions such as the FAR or DFARS. Some local
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instructions exist which address competition or breakout.
In many cases, the initiatives have been indirectly-
implemented by incorporating BOSS related functions in the
position descriptions of local personnel.
4. How can the Competition Advocate at the field level
facilitate the institutionalization process?
The role of the Competition Advocate is to perform
review and oversight functions concerning the execution of
statutes, regulations, and policies affecting competition on
a systematic basis. The role is obviously a very broad and
encompassing one that overlaps the BOSS Program's
interdependent goals. Considering that the BOSS Program
deals with competition in one form or another, an aggressive
field level Competition Advocate will indirectly facilitate
the institutionalization process by the very nature of his
or her job.
5. How might the Automation of Procurement and Accounting
Data Entry (APADE) facilitate implementation of BOSS
Program Initiatives?
An integrated, self-contained program, APADE provides a
standardized procurement system that automates the total
acquisition process from requisition input to the completion
of an awarded contract. APADE offers avenues for
institutionalizing initiatives into the very fabric of the
program itself. Required steps in awarding contracts that
cannot be circumvented prior to award are an effective
method of integrating the BOSS initiatives into the
Acquisition and Logistics process.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Two items that could warrant further research. They
involve productive unit weight determination for Breakout
and competition under BOSS, and identification of specific





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES
TEN POINTS (FROM MEMO OF 25 JUL 83)
1. SECDEF Initiative: Offer incentives to increase
competitive bidding and reward employees who vigorously
pursue cost savings.
2. SECDEF Initiative: Take stern disciplinary action
against those employees who are negligent in implementing
our procedures.
3. SECDEF Initiative: Alert defense contractors to the
seriousness of the problem and our firm intention to deep
prices under control.
4. SECDEF Initiative: Ensure that competition advocates
challenge orders that are not made competitively or appear
to be excessively priced.
5. SECDEF Initiative: Refuse to pay unjustified price
increases.
6. SECDEF Initiative: Accelerate reform of basic contract
procedures.
7. SECDEF Initiative: Take steps to obtain refunds in
instances where we have been overcharged.
8. SECDEF Initiative: Cease doing business with those
contractors who are guilty of unjustified and excessive
pricing and who refuse to refund any improper overcharges.
9. SECDEF Initiative: Continue audits and investigations.
10. SECDEF Initiative: Eliminate excessive pricing, recover
unjustified payments and take corrective action against
those contractors and employees who ar either negligent in
performing their duties or are engaging in excessive pricing
practices.
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ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES (FROM MEMO OF 29 AUG 83)
11. SECDEF Initiative: Provide resources to induce
desirable breakout, effective competitive procurement and
improved pricing in the acquisition of spare parts.
12. SECDEF Initiative: Apply the DOD Parts Program to
enhance competition.
13. SECDEF Initiative: Accelerate plans for acquisition of
computer hardware and software to assist parts control
personnel.
14. SECDEF Initiative: Institute action to identify
disparities in spare parts prices within and among various
procuring activities.
15. SECDEF Initiative: Employ value engineering to
investigate parts where cost or price exceeds intrinsic
value.
16. SECDEF Initiative: Assign more engineering resources to
review new procurement data packages foe accuracy.
17. SECDEF Initiative: Develop and test a procedure to make
breakout of parts a factor in source selection for new major
systems. Develop new incentive arrangements to reward
contractors for cost savings generated by their efforts.
18. SECDEF Initiative: Negotiate contract data provisions
which, as appropriate, reduce contractors' proprietary
rights in data.
19. SECDEF Initiative: Designate acquisition of spare parts
and reprocurement data as an agenda item in Acquisition
Strategy Panels, Advance Acquisition plans, and Acquisition
Review Councils and Logistic Review Group sessions.
20. SECDEF Initiative: Revise performance evaluation
factors for acquisition and logistics mammagers. Include
emphasis on spare parts pricing, breakout, competition and
value engineering accomplishments.
21. SECDEF Initiative: Implement. DAR Supplement No. 6.
22. SECDEF Initiative: Consider in all contracts, as
appropriate the government's right and ability to breakout
and procure competitively spare parts.
23. SECDEF Initiative: Discourage use of government
specifications and contractor proposed engineering designs
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that inhibit subsequent competitive procurement of spare
parts.
24. SECDEF Initiative: Continue action on SECDEF Ten Point
Program to ensure that prices paid for all spare parts are
fair and reasonable.
25. SECDEF Initiative: Pursue appropriate refunds or other
recoupments vigorously following any audit or other
disclosure of incorrect pricing or overcharge.
26. SECDEF Initiative: Review existing contracts to fully
address any and all opportunities for improved pricing of
spare parts, including breakout and competition.
27. SECDEF Initiative: Instruct acquisition personnel to
challenge any procurement action for spare parts where the
estimated or negotiated price appears unrelated to intrinsic
value.
28. SECDEF Initiative: Reexamine existing policy on patent
and data rights arising under government funded IR&D.
29. SECDEF Initiative: Expand training curricula to ensure
emphasis, understanding and technical skill level for all
personnel engaged in the acquisition of spare parts.
30. SECDEF Initiative: Assign special task forces to review
existing reprocurement data packages for spare parts with
high annual buy values.
31. SECDEF Initiative: Evaluate and make recommendations
for changes to existing authorization, appropriation,
apportionment, budgeting and financial management practices
and regulations pertaining to acquisition of spares.
32. SECDEF Initiative: Pursue with appropriate
congressional committees and their staffs the merit of a
two-year authorization of replenishment spare parts and
consumables.
33. SECDEF Initiative: Insist on contract terms and
conditions in all future acquisitions that afford more
equitable treatment and provide for greater assurance of
fair and reasonable prices.
34. SECDEF Initiative: Automate data repositories to
improve the acquisition, storage, update and retrieval of
reprocurement technical data.
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35. SECDEF Initiative: Evaluate and assess accomplishments




THE 12 6 INITIATIVES
SUMMARY OF BOSS INITIATIVES
RD - Requirements Determination PS - Price Surveillance
B - Breakout — CM - Contract Management
C - Competition T - Training
MP - Method of Procurement AS - Automated Systems
p - Pricing R - Resources
REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION (RD)
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-001/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Review procurement and provisioning policies to ensure
that common use items are not automatically included in
contractor interim and life cycle maintenance/supply support
packages
GOAL: Provide field activities with a summary of applicable
existing references or, if no references exist, approval by
COMNAVSUP of new policy guidance for issuance to field.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Prepare point paper describing what happened at NTEC and
what changes should be made in provisioning policy for training
devices.
GOAL: To promulgate new guidance, if required, regarding policy
for provisioning training devices.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Research the EOQ issue decision rules to ascertain how
they may be applied to decrease the overall cost of spare parts.
GOAL: Provide direction for the use of EOQ/annual buys in order
to decrease the overall cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Definitize policy on when supply system stock must be
used to fill requirements identified by NSN, to include new
construction, commercial DOPs, interim life cycle
maintenance/supply support, and Navy supply system support.
GOAL: Provide a summary of applicable existing references or, if
no references exist, promulgate new policy guidance to field
activities.
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INITIATIVE NO.: RD-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Work with GSA/DLA to reduce the number of AAC "L" items
bought in the field.
GOAL: Reduce the number of AAC "L" items to the lowest practical
level.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Require mandatory application of the DOD Parts Control
Program as defined by DODI 4120.19 in all weapon system
contracts.
GOAL: Issue guidance requiring the inclusion of the DOD Parts
Control Program in all acquisition POA&Ms.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-007/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Review existing policies and procedures for making
repair vs. buy decision on repairable items and issue appropriate
guidance to field activities who make such decisions.
GOAL: Ensure that decisions to buy or repair spare parts are
economically sound.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Pursue the concept of consistent fill rates/Average Days
Delay (ADD) among services as a basis for balanced weapon system
support funding.
GOAL: To evaluate whether budgeted requirements are achieving
required support for spares, and to determine what additional
resources are needed to achieve increased levels.
INITIATIVE NO.: RD-009/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Determine the feasibility of competing spares buys for
initially competed equipment.
GOAL: To allow ICPs to make competitive buys rather than sole
source PlOs/direct procurements for spares buys.
BREAKOUT (B)
INITIATIVE NO.: B-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Implement DAR Supplement 6 and establish Breakout
Program at Inventory Control Points and Hardware Systems
Commands.
GOAL: To ensure that the Navy implements a viable Breakout
Program in order to obtain maximum competition in the acquisition
of spare parts.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Designate SES as full-time technical advocate for
breakout.
GOAL: To provide, within NAVSUP, a high-level position to ensure
the successful implementation of a visible Breakout Program.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Establish a formal program to challenge proprietary data
restrictions on parts for existing systems.
GOAL: To challenge invalid proprietary data claims by
contractors. Where necessary, legal action will be pursued to
obtain data.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-004/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Prioritize and fund acquisition of reprocurement
technical data in ILS planning process.
GOAL: To ensure that all data required to allow maximum
competition during the reprocurement of spares is acquired during
the Integrated Logistics Support process.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION: Establish liaison with upper level corporate managers to
sell Navy's competitive/breakout strategy.
GOAL: To involve industry-executives in supporting the Department
of Defense increased competition program.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-006/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a course on spare parts breakout which is aimed
at engineers.
GOAL: To provide engineers with the knowledge necessary to
ensure the successful implementation of Navy's Breakout Program.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a policy as to when rights in data can be
limited.
GOAL: To ensure that reprocurement data is provided to the
government to the maximum extent under the law.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a certification to be included in all
solicitations for spare parts requiring contractors to indicate
whether they (1) manufacture, (2) buy, (3) assemble, or (4) test
the item being sold to the government.
GOAL: Field activities will utilize certification to ensure that
the maximum level of competition is attained in the procurement
of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop procedures for ICPs to utilize the information
obtained as certifications in B-008 to promote both procurement
from OEMs and competition.
GOAL: To make available during the reprocurement process, data
relative to known sources of the material.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-010/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Expand the warranty clause of weapon systems procurement
packages to permit the government to charge the contractor the
costs incurred for correcting any defective data package.
GOAL: To minimize the cost to the government of having
incomplete and inaccurate data.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-011/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts that gives
the government the right to forward data packages to an
independent (non-government) data review contractor to determine
validity of proprietary data restrictions.
GOAL: To ensure that the government obtains rights to all data
to which it is entitled.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-012/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Ensure Acquisition Method Code(AMC) conferences are held
to the maximum extent possible and as early as practicable.
Breakout benefits in terms of numbers reviewed, codes assigned,
estimated annual dollar demand and other pertinent data are to be
reported on a monthly basis.
GOAL: To achieve the maximum extent of competition in future
reprocurement actions.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-013/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Propose a change to MIL-D-1000B to restore Category F
drawings as a requirement under the MILSPEC.
GOAL: To obtain the maximum amount of technical data during ;the
acquisition process.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts whereby
contractors are required to identify the cost for the government
to acquire unlimited rights to reprocurement technical data, and
are required to identify the extent to which they are using
standard commercial products.
GOAL: Too ensure that the government has the maximum amount of
technical data and other information in order to increase the
level of competition during the reprocurement of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop a clause for weapon systems contracts requiring
contractors to identify the OEM and the OEM part numbers of
purchase parts.
GOAL: To increase to the maximum extent competition in the
procurement of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-016/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Provide three technical data packages that are
noncompetitive due to proprietary legends - packages to be
forwarded to ASN(S&L)
.
GOAL: To provide ASN(S&L) with examples of the problems
encountered in obtaining data rights.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-017/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop and test a procedure to make breakout of spare
parts a factor in source selection for major systems. Develop
incentive arrangements to reward contractors for cost savings
generated by their efforts.
GOAL: To obtain the lowest possible price for spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-018/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop contract data provisions which, as appropriate,
reduce contractors' proprietary rights in data.
GOAL: To increase the amount of technical data available to the
government
.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-019/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Establish a management information system to track the
success of the conversion from contractor recommended procurement
codes to fully competitive procurement status so that the
benefits of the program are established versus the cost to
administer it.
GOAL: To quantify the benefits of the Breakout Program.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-020/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Research contractor licensing arrangement (such as that
between Sikorsky and Agusta) of top 20 contractors.
GOAL; To identify licensing arrangements which can be utilized
for direct procurement from the OEM.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-021/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
•
ACTION: Develop a contractual provision permitting deferred
ordering of engineering data that required contractor maintenance
of engineering data through post production.
GOAL: To ensure that current technical data is available from
the contractor for reprocurement
.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-022/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Ensure an increaser in and monitor the number of items
that are AMC coded.
GOAL: To promote competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-023/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop policy document for ICPs/HSCs defining
requirement for obtaining technical data and Level II/III
drawings for new weapon system acquisitions.
GOAL: To provide definitive guidance to ICPs and HSCs relative
to obtaining technical data and Level II/III drawings.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-024/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Include the acquisition of reprocurement data as part of
modification management.
GOAL: To ensure that data is acquired on spares for systems
requiring modification.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-0 2 5/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Ensure that all data files related to technical support
and procurement of spares contain accurate and up-to-date
information.
GOAL: To facilitate competition in the reprocurement of spares.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-026/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Establish procedures to request ACOs to provide lists of
Navy managed items that contractors purchase complete from
subcontractors and to screen these items for purchase breakout to
the subcontractor.
GOAL: To expand the possible sources of spare parts.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-027/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Periodically request lists of purchase-completed items
and maintain records of breakout reviews of these items.
GOAL: To expand competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-02 8/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Instruct personnel responsible for technical reviews of
item purchases in the need for effective examination of drawings
or other data in limited-screening purchase breakout efforts.
GOAL: To ensure that adequate review of technical data is
performed.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-029/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a supply bailment policy to govern agreements
whereby commercial activities can borrow parts of components from
the ICPs inventories for the purpose of design replication,
development of reprocurement data packages and subsequent offer
to supply same.
GOAL: To define NAVSUP bailment policy and issue guidance.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-030/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop and implement a management plan to evaluate and
reduce unnecessary contract specifications and acquisition
requirements
.
GOAL: To eliminate unnecessary contract specifications and
acquisition requirements.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-031/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Implement a reverse engineering program to obtain
reprocurement technical data packages suitable for competition.
GOAL: To use reverse engineering, when feasible, to develop
technical data packages suitable for competition when otherwise
sole source procurement is necessary.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-032/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Define the policy for application of warranties to
secondary items, and issue MAVSUPINST on warranty policy.
GOAL: To define NAVSUP warranty and issue guidance.
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INITIATIVE NO.: B-033/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: In the area of repairables, pursue the possibility of
expanding ICP use of ship repair contractors who are working for
SUPSHIPs and Type Commanders into the ICP repair base.
GOAL: To increase the competitive base and assure fair and
reasonable costs are incurred in repair contracts.
INITIATIVE NO.: B-034/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Propose changes to MIL-STD 129 to include marking of
unit packages with actual manufacturers FSCM and Part Number.
GOAL: To aid in breakout to OEM by requiring identification when
a spare part is procured from a manufacturer other than the
design activity.
COMPETITION (C)
INITIATIVE NO.: C-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Establish FY84 competition goals for major field
procurement activities.
GOAL: To increase the number of procurements made on a
competitive basis.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1&3
ACTION: Issue FLASH from COMNAVSUP on competition.
GOAL: To make field activities aware of the importance of, and
level of attention being given to, efforts to increase
competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Review competitive procurement for Interim Support Item
List (ISILs) .
GOAL: To provide an explanation of the ISIL concept and explore
the pros/cons of competitive procurement for ISILs.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Strengthen the process for inspection and acceptance of
technical data by cognizant engineers/technicians. Require
engineers/technicians to validate with recognizable annotation
that they were reviewed for adequacy and completeness.
GOAL: To ensure that the advantages of competition are fully
exploited by having adequate technical information available.
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INITIATIVE NO.: C-005/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Publish a system listing of sole source items broken out
to competition for use by all field contracting activities.
GOAL: To provide field contracting activities with the
information to increase the level of competitive procurements.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION: Provide guidance to field activities on incorporation of
competition/pricing goals into Merit Pay System (MPS) objectives
and the Basic Performance Appraisal Program (BPAP)
.
GOAL: To bring the importance of the competition/spares pricing
to the individual employee level.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION
:
Appoint Competition Advocates at all activities with
$25,000 authority and establish a "Competition Advocate of the
Quarter" award program.
GOAL: To establish a focal point for all efforts related to
increasing competition and improving spares pricing, and to
officially recognize those individuals who have made a
significant contribution to those efforts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Conduct test of adding applicable MILSPEC/MILSTD numbers
and method of fabrication information to Commerce Business Daily
announcements
.
GOAL: To increase to number of potential sources for procuring
spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS:
ACTION: Develop in-house operating procedures whereby the
Competition Advocate is informed of all unsolicited proposals for
sole source items so that identified source of supply is
considered on future procurement.
GOAL: To expand the possible sources from which to procure spare
parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-010/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION: Revise position descriptions and establish new critical
elements and performance standards to motivate employees to
reduce costs and increase competition.
GOAL: To bring the importance of competition/spares to the
individual employee level.
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INITIATIVE NO.: C-011/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #8
ACTION: Develop and promulgate uniform guidance for approval of
alternate manufacturing sources for items with restrictive
acquisition method codes.
GOAL: To identify additional manufacturing sources.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Initiate action to improve the response time in which
Navy Engineering Support Activities (ESAs) respond to requests
for technical data from DLA Inventory Control Points
GOAL: To ensure that the ICP managing the item has sufficient
information to promote competition and to procure the correct
item.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION: Develop and implement procedures to review Acquisition
Plans (APs) and business clearances for an adequate "Spare Parts
Annex" section.
GOAL: To assess the adequacy of provisions for acquiring
technical documentation for spares competition/breakout.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION: COMNAVSUP meet with major Navy suppliers to address
spares pricing and cost issues.
GOAL: To interface with industry in the area of increasing
competition and fair pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #3&6
ACTION: ICPs prepare a Command Competition Advocate Pamphlet
that includes a section on availability of projected buy
requirements listing. Pamphlet to be included with local
publications on how to do business with the ICP, "Selling to the
Military", and for pick-up.
GOAL: Advertise availability of projected buy listings to
support generating second sources and competition.
INITIATIVE NO.: C-016/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION: Define and establish "Model Business Relationships" with
major weapons systems manufacturing which we are dependent on for
nonstandard/standard repair parts.
GOAL: To establish better relationships with companies such as
Grumman.
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METHOD OF PROCUREMENT (MP)
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Continue action under the Spare Acquisition Integrated
with Production (SAIP) and Timely Spares Provisioning (TSP)
programs
.
GOAL: To reduce the overall cost of procuring spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Exploit combined purchased for Navy/Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) customers.
GOAL: To reduce the cost of producing spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Centralize procurement of fleet unit non-standard CASREP
requisitions at SPCC.
GOAL: To reduce the overall cost of procuring these spare parts
and to provide more responsive service to fleet customers.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Review the use of unpriced orders with the goal of
reducing the total number issued; assure that 98 percent of
unpriced orders are definitized within six months of issue and
100 percent definitized within 12 months.
GOAL: To reduce the ultimate cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Expand use of multi-year contracts for spares.
GOAL: To reduce the overall cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: MP-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop and establish automated bidders mailing lists at
procurement activities.
GOAL: To facilitate increased competition for spare parts.
PRICING (P)
INITIATIVE NO.: P-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Send message to DLA requesting review of pricing
techniques.
GOAL: To ensure that the lowest possible prices are being paid
for spare parts.
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INITIATIVE NO.: P-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION: Send message to DCAA requesting operational audit of
Gould and determination if other contractors have pricing
techniques similar to Gould's.
GOAL: To ensure that the government is paying the lowest
reasonable price for an item.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Phase out redeterminate Basic Ordering Agreements.
GOAL: To ensure that the Navy obtains the best possible price
for an item at the time it is ordered.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Assign personnel to do value engineering review of spare
parts purchased.
GOAL: To increase the level of value engineering performed at
Navy contracting activities.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Review Navy policy on reliance on DCAS to negotiate
prices and prepare a point paper summarizing results of review
and recommending policy changes as required.
GOAL: To assess the need for policy change.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Publish Field Contracting Alert concerning allocation of
overhead to spare parts.
GOAL: To advise field contracting activities to monitor
contractors' method of overhead allocation to spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Request the Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey to
prepare an analysis of Navy cost to procure material.
GOAL: To ascertain the cost to procure material, including cost
for stock point to receive and issue. Cost computed will be
available for use in other analyses concerning overall spares
acquisition process.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Analyze prices of NSN material bought locally by a stock
point and develop lessons learned.
GOAL: To assess the impact relative to spare parts prices of
locally procured spares.
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INITIATIVE NO.: P-009/Continuing SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Establish more realistic initial estimated prices for
initial spare parts and consolidate initial buy quantities of
provisioned items.
GOAL: To minimize the impact of inaccurate prices on the
material budgeting process and to ensure economies are realized
during the initial buy process.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-010/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Provide buyers with visibility of all interchangeable
part numbers within a given family group.
GOAL: To identify possible substitute items and to identify less
costly items.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-011/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Identify and attack instances where Navy is paying
interdivisional mark-up on spares.
GOAL: To reduce the cost of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Provide policy guidance to NFCS activities to ensure
that the government is charged no more than a vendor would charge
its best customer.
GOAL: To achieve the best possible fair price.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Increase awareness of Price Fighter mission.
GOAL: To have all contracting personnel, as well as end users,
aware of the Navy Price Fighters mission, and informed of cost
cutting tips learned by the Price Fighter Group.
INITIATIVE NO.: P-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Conduct test of Price Fighter data available to buyers
on 6-10 cases selected by the ICPs.
GOAL: Determine how Price Fighter data can benefit buyers.
PRICE SURVEILLANCE (PS)
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1-10
ACTION: Prepare ALNAV covering pricing/competition.
GOAL: To establish CNO policy in support of SECDEF 's TEN POINT
PLAN.
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INITIATIVE NO.: PS-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION: In conjunction with the implementation of the stock
funding of Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs) , sensitize
Navy users regarding the reasonableness of spare parts prices.
GOAL: To avoid paying exorbitant prices for Navy requirements.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-003/Continuing SECDEF 10 PTS: #3
ACTION: Mount proactive media coverage of positive actions taken
on pricing/competition front.
GOAL: To keep the public informed of actions taken to improve
spare parts pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-004/Continuing SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION: Recognize military and civilian employees who achieve
significant price reductions.
GOAL: Through recognition of these employees, the importance of
improved spares pricing will be brought to the attention of all
personnel.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop NAVSUP capability to do value analysis (should
cost analysis) of material. "PRICE FIGHTER"
GOAL: To identify items which are overpriced.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION: Establish a formal program to conduct in-depth reviews
of "out of tolerance" prices.
GOAL: To identify unwarranted increase in spare parts prices.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION: Establish new Price Analysis filters in the UICP program
G02.
GOAL: To ascertain the best parameter (s) for the program.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION: Direct field activities to identify cases to cognizant
engineering activities wnere intrinsic value is nor consistent
with established price.
GOAL: To provide a mechanism whereby personnel in the field can
identify questionable spare parts prices which should be
investigated.
118
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Establish system to monitor Contract Administer Office
(CAO) pricing of BOA orders originating by the ICPs.
GOAL: To identify pricing and response time difficulties created
by CAOs.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-010/Cancelled SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Issue quarterly report cards to Administrative
Contracting Offices (CAOs) DCAS and DLA HQ on timeliness of
pricing actions.
GOAL: To advise DCAS and DLA HQ of their performance so that
action may be taken to improve performance where warranted.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-011/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Perform price comparison test of items priced
prospectively vs. after award and report results.
GOAL: To ascertain impact of pricing techniques on final price
of item.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-012/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Conduct random sample of 125 items to determine if
prices paid increased or decreased.
GOAL: To ascertain recent trends in the prices of spare parts.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-013/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Conduct an analysis of 3 items on draft audit report
3AP-021 for which prices increased by 100 percent or more.
GOAL: To asses validity of prices.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-014/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Develop a program which will compare and display the
prices paid for locally purchased stock numbered (AAC "L") items
reported by NFCS activities.
GOAL: To provide item managers and field contracting personnel
with a tool for determining the lowest price available.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-015/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #4
ACTION: Receive, review and reply to reports of excessive
pricing received from Navy customers.
GOAL: To challenge DLA and/or other Services' excessive price
increases.
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INITIATIVE NO.: PS-016/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #1
ACTION: Review, and refine if necessary, NAVSUP's employee
recognition program.
GOAL: In view of emphasis being placed on spare parts
procurement and in support of initiative PS-004, the NAVSUP
employee recognition program n\must be adequately implemented.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-017/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop criteria for evaluating the PRICE FIGHTER
program to include appropriate cost benefit analyses and
alternatives for expanding capabilities.
GOAL: To objectively evaluate the results of the pilot PRICE
FIGHTER team.
'
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-018/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #5
ACTION: Develop and promulgate to the NFCS a checklist of the
minimum requirements for documentation of price reasonableness.
GOAL: To provide guidance to the field to assist them in
pricing.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-019/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Determine if FPI/NIB prices should be challenged through
formal procedures when the item can be bought from a commercial
source at a lower price.
GOAL: To assure fair and reasonable prices are paid for all
items.
INITIATIVE NO.: PS-020/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Conduct 3 month pilot test hotline providing real time
"should cost" estimates within a responsible timeframe for live
buys at the following activities: NSC Norfolk, NAS Norfolk, NAS
Oceana. Assess the value of Price Fighter interface with buying
activities and provide recommendations for permanent program.
GOAL: To provide buyers with should cost analyses to assist in
negotiating fair and reasonable prices.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (CM)
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #7
ACTION: Perform in-depth review of Naval Training and Equipment
Center (NTEC) contracts.
GOAL: To recommend corrective action to NTEC contracting
procedures.
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INITIATIVE NO.: CM-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION: Reduce NTEC contracting authority; provide detailed
guidance to NTEC/NSC Charleston on transfer of contracting
authority.
GOAL: To suspend the awarding of contracts over $500K pending
resolution of NTEC contract procedure problems.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION: Elevate pricing and competition to special interest
items on Contract Management Reviews (CMRs)
.
GOAL: To ensure that pricing and competition areas are given
particular attention during CMRs.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #7&8
ACTION: Accept refunds from contractors who have overcharged.
Recommend suspension/debarment of vendors defrauding the
government
.
GOAL: To solicit refunds where deemed appropriate, and to
penalize vendors when such action is considered necessary.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: All contracts for spare parts and repair kits of $25,000
or more for other than standard commercial parts will contain a
value engineering incentive clause.
GOAL: To comply with DOD Directive 5010.8.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #2
ACTION: Ensure all Naval Reserve Officers assigned to Navy field
Contracting System activities ar briefed on standards of conduct,
particularly in regard to conflict of interest.
GOAL: To preclude any impropriety or the appearance of
impropriety which may result from Reservists performing functions
within the contracting organization.
INITIATIVE NO.: CM-007/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Initiate change to the existing Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS) which allow contractors to allocate overhead/G&A
burdens to spares orders which in many instances are
substantially disproportionate to the value which the contractor
has added.





INITIATIVE NO.: T-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #9
ACTION: Arrange for the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) to
train CMR teams, including ICP internal review teams, in fraud
detection techniques.
GOAL: To ensure that contracting personnel are aware of ways in
which to detect contractor fraudulent practices.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Review training/qualification criteria for promotion in
1102/1105 series and develop new criteria as required.
GOAL: The emphasis being placed on improving competition and
spares pricing dictates that all procurement personnel be fully
qualified before assuming more responsible positions.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Mandate semi-annual cost/price analysis courses to be
held on-site at ICPs.
GOAL: To ensure that contracting personnel are aware of most
recent cost/price analysis techniques.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Require 1102 personnel to take refresher cost/price
analysis course every three years.
GOAL: To keep the personnel in the 1102 series current with
cost/price techniques.
INITIATIVE NO.: T-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Review requirements for issuing warrants to Contracting
Officers.
GOAL: To ensure that only those fully qualified individuals be
issued warrants.
AUTOMATED SYSTEMS (AS)
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-001/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Increase automation of procurement process.
GOAL: To increase the ability of the NAVSUP field contracting
activities to manage the procurement process through automation.
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INITIATIVE NO.: AS-002/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Conduct a review of technical data access procedures
utilized by the ICPs.
GOAL: Develop recommendation for improving the processes.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-003/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Develop an automated system which will provide buyers
with on-line access to information such as MILSPECs, price
history and pictoral presentations to assist in the
declericalization of procurement.
GOAL: To reduce the clerical approach involved in procurement
and to provide buyers with required information.
INITIATIVE NO: AS-004/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Implement Navy Print On Demand System (NPODS) at the
Naval Publications and Forms Center (NPFC)
.
GOAL: NPODS will enable NPFC to provide potential contractors
with applicable specifications and standards more responsively
and at less cost than at present.
INITIATIVE NO.: AS-005/Outstanding SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Convert data repository technical files supporting ICP
reprocurement to an electronic form.
GOAL: To provide buyers and item managers with technical data in
a more timely manner.
INITIATIVE NO. AS-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #6
ACTION: Implement Military Standard Contract Administration
Procedures (MILSCAP) at Navy activities.
GOAL: To enhance the Navy's efforts to improve the spare parts
acquisition process and to facilitate the transmission and use of
data between and among DOD components.
RESOURCES (R)
INITIATIVE NO.: R-001/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Increase resources (funds/end strength) to enhance
competition and pricing at NAVSUP procurement activities.
GOAL: To enable NAVSUP activities to buy spares more
effectively.
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INITIATIVE NO.: R-002/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Provide additional resources to ASO/SPCC and Hardware
Systems Commands to increase breakout efforts.
GOAL: To enable the ICPs to achieve high levels of competition
in spares procurement.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-003/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Increase FY84/85 funding to accelarate the
implementation of the Automated Procurement and Data Entry System
(APADE) at NSCs and NRCCs.
GOAL: To declericalize the procurement process at field
activities.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-004/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Obtain FY84/85 R&D funds to automate data repositories
at NAVSUP activities; i.e., NPODS at NPFC.
GOAL: To reduce the manual workload associated with data
retrieval.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-005/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Provide funds and end strength to staff a "PRICE
FIGHTER" value analysis team.
GOAL: To develope an intrinsic value analysis capability.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-006/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Provide resources to increase Value Engineering efforts.
GOAL: To improve Value Engineering programs at Navy ICPs.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-007/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Provide funds for increased training of procurement
personnel.
GOAL: To upgrade the expertise in spares acquisitions.
INITIATIVE NO.: R-008/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Review staffing of procurement functions at non-NAVSUP
field contracting activities.
GOAL: Identify shortfalls where they exist and pursue additional
resources where required.
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INITIATIVE NO.: R-009/Completed SECDEF 10 PTS: #10
ACTION: Develope and implement a system to identify and track
the cost of, and savings attributed to the major Project BOSS
programs such as Breakout, challenges to proprietary legends,
etc.
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Orcutt, L. , Naval Regional Contracting Center, Long
Beach, Ca.
Parker, J., (Code OOC/056), Ships Parts Control Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa.
Quigley, R. , CDR, SC, USN, Code 5502, Naval Supply
Systems Command, PML 550, Washington, D.C.
Stambaugh, H.
,
(CCE-A) , Aviation Supply Office,
Philadelphia, Pa.
Suer, R. , LCDR, SC, USN, (Code 200), Naval Supply
Center, Oakland, Ca.
Sullivan, J. , Deputy Competition Advocate, Aviation
Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pa.
127
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. General Accounting Office, Procurement: POD Initiatives
to Improve the Acquisition of Spare Parts , 1986.
2. Logistics Management Institute, "Spare Parts Pricing,"
Logistics Management Institute . Washington, D.C., 15
November 1963.
3. U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, Review of the Spare Parts
Procurement Practices of the Department of Defense .
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 1984.
4. Secretary of Defense Ten Point Memorandum for the
Service Secretaries, Subject: Spare Parts Acquisition
.
25 July 1983.
5. Secretary of Defense Twenty Five Point Memorandum to the
Secretaries, Subject: Spare Parts Acquisition , October
1983.
6. A Quest for Excellence . Final Report to the President by
the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, June 198 6.
7. Borkland, C.W. , "Will the Cure Cost More than the Cold?"
Government Executive . January 1984.
8. Naval Supply Systems Command, Buy Our Spares Smart
Annual Report. FY84 . 1985.
9. Naval Supply Systems Command, Buy Our Spares Smart
Annual Report. FY8 5 . 12 March 1986.
10. Naval Supply Systems Command, Buy Our Spares Smart
Annual Report. FY86 . 30 December 1986.
11. Defense Management Journal, Spare Parts Prices in
Perspective , by M.N. Shriler, Fourth Quarter 1985.
12. Brown, Calvin, "The Nuts and Bolts of Procuring Spare
Parts," Program Manager , July-August 1984.
13. Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Summary Report on
the Defense-wide Audit of Procurement of Spare Parts
—
Information Memorandum, 25 May 1984.
128
14. All Hands, Getting a Handle on Spare Parts , by W. Berry,
March 1984.
15. Naval Supply Systems Command Publication 560, Navy
Supply Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SUPARS) .
Volume 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 October
1985.
16. "Pricing and Spare Parts," Naval Message from Chief of
Naval Operations to Naval Operating Forces, Date and
Time Group 0621272 June 1985.
17. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Report to the
Congress, Review of the Spare Parts Procurement
Practices of the Department of Defense , June 1984.
18. U.S. Department of Defense, POD Replenishment Spare
Parts Breakout Program , Defense Acquisition Regulation
Supplement No. 6, 1 June 1983.
19. Executive Order 12352, Federal Procurement Reforms ,
March 17, 1982.
20. General Counsel of the Navy Memorandum, The Obligation
to Foster Competition in Procurement . April 7, 1983.
21. Navy Procurement Competition, FY 198 6 Report to
Congress . Office of the Competition Advocate General of
the Navy, December 1986.
22. Genovese, J.J., "Policy Strategy and Results Improve
Navy Spares Acquisition," Program Manager . May-June
1985.
23. Hayward, Daniel S., Captain, SC, USN, Director of Supply
Support, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics), Washington, D.C.,
interview granted 23 April 1987.
24. Keller, Frank, Commander, SC, USN, PML-5501, BOSS
Project Director, PML 550, Washington, D.C., interview
granted 2 March 1987.
25. Sullivan, J., PML-5503, Breakout Director, PLM 550,
Washington, D.C., interview granted 2 March 1987.
26. Brown, Bonnie, PML-5501B, Initiatives Monitor, PML 550,
Washington, D.C., interview granted 29 May 1987.
27. Genovese, J. J.
,
"The Navy Cuts Spare Costs But Keeps
Quality High," Defense Management . Fourth Quarter 1985.
129
28. Metzel, Walter L. , Competition Division Director,
Competition Advocacy Department, Navy Aviation Supply
Office, Philadelphia, Pa, interview granted 5 March
1987.
29. Contract Management, APADE Offers New Horizons to the
Navy Procurement System , A Contract Management Report,
March 1987.
30. U.S. Department of the Navy, Navy's APADE Training Team
(NATT) , "Orientation of the Navy's Automation of
Procurement and Accounting Data Entry System (APADE),"
Norfolk, Virginia, 1986.
31. Lewin, Kurt, Field Theory in Social Science: Selected
Theoretical Papers . New York, Harper and Brothers, 1951.
32. Schein, Edgar H. , Organizational Psychology . 3rd ed.
,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1980.
33. Kotter, John P. and Schlesinger, Leonard A., "Choosing
Strategies for Change," Harvard Business Review . Vol.
57, No. 2, March-April 1979.
34. Naval Supply Systems Command Instruction 7000. 21A,
Productive Unit Resourcing at Naval Supply System
Command (NAVSUP) Field Activities , 12 December 1986.
35. Morris, John, Procurement Code 024E, Naval Supply System





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145





Defense Logistics Studies Information 2
Exchange
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
4. Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey California 93943-5000
5. Naval Supply Systems Command 1
PML-5501
Washington D. C.
6. Dr. David V. Lamm, Code 54Lt 5
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7. Dr. Paul M. Carrick, Code 54Ca 2
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
8. Ronald J. Stearns 2
110 Canyon Woods Loop Apt 188













buy our spare parts
(BOSS) initiatives with-





FEB 90 3 6 2 1





buy our spare parts
(BOSS) initiatives with-
in the Navy Filed Con-
tracting System (NFCS)
.

